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CHEAPER, BETTER, LONGER-LASTING: A RIGHTS-BASED
APPROACH TO DISASTER RESPONSE IN HAITI
Brian Concannon Jr.∗
Beatrice Lindstrom∗∗
INTRODUCTION
On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake shook Haiti, crumbling
the capital and surrounding areas.1 The quake killed more than 200,000 people
by most estimates and displaced more than 1.5 million.2 In the immediate
aftermath of the earthquake, the international community responded swiftly:
nearly half of all households in the United States made charitable donations to
Haiti,3 governments and multilateral organizations pledged billions of dollars,4
and international nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) swarmed into
Haiti’s capitol, Port-au-Prince.5 But this tremendous generosity at the giving
end has not, in almost two years, translated into even adequate progress on the
ground for Haiti’s earthquake victims, infrastructure, and economy. Many
analyses of the response grade it a “failure,”6 and at best it has been painfully
slow.7 Thousands of blue and gray tents continue to sit sandwiched between

∗

Director, Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti (“IJDH”), Boston, Massachusetts.
Law Fellow, Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (“BAI”), Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
1 Jason Beaubien, Against a Scarred Landscape, Haitians Persevere, NPR (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.
npr.org/2011/01/05/132657376/against-a-scarred-landscape-haitians-persevere.
2 Id.
3 Tarini Parti, Haiti Earthquake: Six Months Later, Are Relief Efforts Dragging?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (July 12, 2010, 6:12 PM), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0712/Haiti-earthquake-Sixmonths-later-are-relief-efforts-dragging.
4 Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Indicators in Crisis: Rights-Based Humanitarian Indicators in Postearthquake Haiti, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 865, 868 (2011).
5 See William O’Neill, Haiti: Can Catastrophe Spur Progress?, SSRC (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.ssrc.
org/features/pages/haiti-now-and-next/1338/1308.
6 See, e.g., Simon Roughneen, Aid Failure Bodes Ill for Haiti, WORLDPRESS.ORG (Feb. 2, 2010), http://
www.worldpress.org/Americas/3491.cfm.
7 Memorandum, Walter Kaelin, Representative of the Sec’y-Gen. on the Human Rights of Internally
Displaced Persons, United Nations, Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons in Haiti: Memorandum
Based on a Working Visit to Port-au-Prince 4 (Oct. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Kaelin], http://www.ijdh.org/
wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Kalin-Statement-2010-Haiti-English.pdf (noting that “reconstruction
has hardly started”).
∗∗
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developments8 and rubble along Port-au-Prince’s roads and hundreds of
thousands of internally displaced persons (“IDPs”) survive in camps that fail to
meet even minimum international standards, severely lacking in access to clean
water, latrines, and security.9
The causes of this frustrating and often lethal gap between great intentions
and limited results are many and complex. Proffered explanations include the
immense scale of the disaster, preexisting weaknesses in Haiti’s governmental
capacity, shortcomings in coordination, delayed dispersal of aid, and
corruption, among others.10 While all these factors certainly play a role, one of
the principal causes is also one of the most overlooked: Haiti’s historical
relationships with the United States and other powerful countries that influence
its destiny, which both prevent Haiti’s government from providing the basic
government services that all successful countries provide and impair the
international community’s ability to respond to the earthquake in an effective,
sustainable way.
This Article explores how the failure of the earthquake response is the
result of past and current policies that, however well intentioned, fail to
adequately respect the human rights of Haitians, especially Haiti’s poor. It
demonstrates that while the earthquake created new acute human rights
challenges for Haiti,11 it also exposed the disastrous effects of decades-old
policies that systematically undermine the Haitian government’s ability to
provide basic governmental services and meet the needs of the majority of its
people.12 A legacy of debt and international trade policies has incapacitated the
Haitian government, and lack of enforcement of the rule of law has made

8 Beatrice Lindstrom, Reflection: As Tomas’ Rains Fall, INST. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY HAITI (Nov. 4,
2010), http://ijdh.org/archives/15298.
9 Ctr. for Human Rights & Global Justice, NYU Sch. of Law et al., Right to Food, Water and Sanitation
[hereinafter Right to Food], in UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW, REPUBLIC OF HAITI: SUBMISSIONS TO THE UN
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 71, 78–79 (Inst. for Justice & Democracy in Haiti, Bureau des Avocats
Internationaux ed., 2011) [hereinafter IJDH SUBMISSION TO THE UNHRC], available at http://www.ijdh.org/
wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/LERN-Compiled-UPR-Submissions1.pdf. Many surveys of IDP
camps have found that they fall below minimum international standards, especially with regard to water,
sanitation, and shelter space. See Right to Food, supra, at 78–79; Kaelin, supra note 7, at 3.
10 See, e.g., Martin Hartberg, Oxfam, From Relief to Recovery: Supporting Good Governance in Postearthquake Haiti 2–3 (Oxfam, Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 142, 2011).
11 See generally Kaelin, supra note 7 (discussing the human rights problems facing IDPs in Haiti after
the 2010 earthquake).
12 Blaine Bookey, Enforcing the Right To Be Free from Sexual Violence and the Role of Lawyers in Postearthquake Haiti, 14 N.Y. CITY L. REV. (forthcoming 2011); see also Kaelin, supra note 7, at 1 (noting that the
earthquake “struck against the backdrop of a chronic crisis”).
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Haiti’s poor disproportionately vulnerable to natural disasters. Haiti’s
earthquake illustrates that the most severe humanitarian emergencies are most
often symptomatic of and contributory to a larger human rights emergency.
A successful disaster response must place human rights at the center. Under
international law, the Haitian government has the primary obligation to realize
the human rights of its people,13 but natural disasters make it difficult for
states, already lacking capacity due to resource constraints, to assert full
control over policies that are central to their ability to fulfill their human rights
obligations. In this context, the international community has an obligation to
support the Haitian government toward the realization of rights, and their
human rights obligations inhere to regulate their interventions.
The most striking aspect of the response to the earthquake in Haiti is
perhaps the decision to treat Haiti as a charity case rather than as a space where
legal obligations exist and guide interventions. This Article presents legal and
practical arguments for why a human rights-based approach is essential to
successful disaster response and shows how a failure to prioritize this
framework continues to reinforce Haiti’s vulnerability to disasters. A human
rights-based approach places human rights protection and realization at the
center of international assistance, ensuring that the plans, policies, and
processes of international assistance are “anchored in a system of rights and
corresponding obligations established by international law.”14 The rights-based
approach ensures that the aim of all activities is to contribute directly to the
realization of rights by prioritizing capacity building, participation,
transparency, accountability, and nondiscrimination. In Haiti, aid has largely
been delivered outside this framework, with a focus on distributions to meet
immediate needs at the cost of investing in long-term infrastructure and
13

See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 2, opened for
signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW];
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pmbl., art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights pmbl., art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 2, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969)
[hereinafter CERD]. In addition to being the parties subject to obligations under international human rights,
states are also traditionally the primary subjects under international law. See, e.g., ROSALYN HIGGINS,
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 39–46 (1994); NICOLA M.C.P. JÄGERS,
CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS: IN SEARCH OF ACCOUNTABILITY 20 (2002).
14 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UNITED NATIONS, FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS ON A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 15 (2006)
[hereinafter OHCHR, FAQS], available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FAQen.pdf.
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structural reform.15 This Article argues that while the practical reality of
humanitarian disasters sometimes contains a tension between competing needs,
an overemphasis on this tension risks overlooking the interconnectedness
between humanitarian relief and human rights enforcement.16
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”)
has identified two chief rationales for the human rights-based approach: (a)
“the intrinsic rationale,” which acknowledges that a human rights-based
approach is legally mandated; and (b) “the instrumental rationale,” which
recognizes that it enables better and more sustainable results.17 This Article
begins by examining the legal rationale for the rights-based approach. Part I
provides an introduction to the content and sources of the rights-based
approach, and then explores the legal obligations of donor states and non-state
actors to work within this framework. Part II uses Haiti as a case study to argue
that the rights-based approach must be implemented as a matter of best
practice even where legal obligations do not demand it. This Part demonstrates
that Haiti’s recent disasters are not only natural, but also stem from systemic
human rights violations that must be addressed. It shows that the rights-based
approach enables more successful programming because it ensures project
effectiveness and guides investment towards those actors that can ensure
project sustainability. If Haiti is to see a different future, the international
community must actively implement a rights-based approach to its
interventions and programming in Haiti.
I. THE INTRINSIC RATIONALE: INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS TO IMPLEMENT
A RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH
A few weeks after the January 12 earthquake, a collaboration of human
rights groups submitted briefings and testified before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”) in support of international actors

15 Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights et al., A Call for Human Rights-Based Approach to
Humanitarian Assistance for Haiti (Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter A Call for Human Rights-Based Approach],
available at http://www.chrgj.org/projects/docs/100114HaitiStatement.pdf.
16 This idea is reflected by others involved in Haiti’s rebuilding. After his visit to Haiti in October 2011,
the Representative of the United Nations (“UN”) Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs, Walter
Kaelin, noted the need to look beyond immediate humanitarian needs, stating that “Haiti is a humanitarian
crisis that needs a development solution. Without development through intelligent reconstruction, a majority of
the population will see their basic social and economic rights not fulfilled and continue to depend on
humanitarian assistance for indefinite periods of time.” Kaelin, supra note 7, at 6.
17 OHCHR, FAQS, supra note 14, at 16.
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employing a rights-based approach in their assistance to Haiti.18 The discussion
below draws from the brief submitted to the IACHR and presents an
explanation of the contents of the rights-based approach. It also summarizes
the legal foundation of the approach to argue that international law mandates
implementation of a rights-based approach.
A. The Human Rights-Based Approach and Its Legal Underpinnings
The human rights-based approach to international assistance is “a
conceptual framework . . . that is normatively based on international human
rights standards and operationally directed to promoting and protecting human
rights.”19 It frames international assistance in the context of entitlements and
obligations, and can be distinguished from a needs-based approach or a
charitable approach to assistance.20 The rights-based approach operationalizes
foundational principles of human rights law, including: “universality and
inalienability;
indivisibility;
interdependence
and
interrelatedness;
nondiscrimination and equality; participation and inclusion; [and]
accountability and the rule of law.”21 The legal obligations to adopt a human
rights-based approach in humanitarian assistance derive from internationally
recognized duties that find their origin in human rights treaties and customary
international law.22
The rights-based approach to assistance uses the human rights framework
to redefine the relationship between stakeholders in society as rights-holders
with entitlements and duty bearers with correlative obligations.23 This
characterization of actors stems from the foundational paradigm of
18 Brief to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for a Hearing on the Economic and Social
Rights Situation in Haiti Following the Earthquake and the Human Rights Obligations of OAS Member States
(Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. 2010) [hereinafter IACHR Brief]; see also Inter-American Human Rights System,
INST. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY HAITI, http://ijdh.org/projects/iachr (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). The Center for
Human Rights and Global Justice took the lead in developing this analysis.
19 OHCHR, FAQS, supra note 14, at 15.
20 See AUSTL. COUNCIL FOR INT’L DEV., MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT: RIGHTS 5 (2009), available at
http://www.acfid.asn.au//what-we-do/docs_what-we-do/docs_hrproject/Millennium%20Development%
20Rights.pdf.
21 OHCHR, FAQS, supra note 14, at 36.
22 See, e.g., CAPACITY DEV. GRP., UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, APPLYING A HUMAN RIGHTSBASED APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AND PROGRAMMING: A UNDP CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT
RESOURCE 5 (2006) [hereinafter APPLYING A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH], available at http://www.
beta.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/capacity-development/a-human-rights-basedapproach-to-development-cooperation/Human-Rights.pdf (noting that a human rights-based approach is
mandated by human rights treaties, constitutions, and national laws).
23 OHCHR, FAQS, supra note 14, at 37.
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international human rights law that sovereign states carry the duty to respect,
protect, and fulfill the human rights of those within their jurisdiction.24 Nonstate actors, albeit to a more limited extent, share this responsibility when
operating in a situation where their actions affect human rights25 and where
they fulfill roles usually filled by national governments.26 Individuals,
regardless of race, sex, creed, or background, are rights-holders entitled to the
equal realization of human rights. The rights-based approach “works towards
strengthening the capacities of rights-holders to make their claims, and of dutybearers to meet their obligations,”27 and provides a mechanism through which
to analyze the responsibility of different actors and to locate accountability for
failures to fulfill human rights.28 This is achieved by designing and delivering
assistance in a manner that prioritizes five key components: capacity
development,
participation,
transparency,
accountability,
and
29
nondiscrimination.
As expounded in the brief to the IACHR, the rights-based approach
prioritizes building the capacity of the Haitian State to guarantee the rights of

24 See Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights & Transnat’l Corps. & Other
Bus. Enters., Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations & Other Business Enterprises: Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, ¶ 6, Human Rights Council,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie).
25 For example, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises has found that corporations have a duty to
respect, protect, and remedy human rights violations caused by their actions. Id.
26 See OHCHR, FAQS, supra note 14, at 3, 37.
27 Id. at 37.
28 See id. at 7.
29 See, e.g., IACHR Brief, supra note 18, at 2; RTS. AGENDA: HRLC MONTHLY BULL. (HUMAN RTS. L.
CTR.), June 2011, at 32, available at http://c742005.r5.cf2.rackcdn.com/files/RightsAgenda_HRLC_
Bulletin_July_2011.pdf (“A human rights-based approach to development does not merely comprise of
funding programs which may promote and protect human rights. Rather, it is an approach to development
which is participatory, empowering, non-discriminatory and focuses first and foremost on the most
marginalised and disadvantaged.”); Indep. Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt & Other Related Int’l Fin.
Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, Particularly Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights,
Rep. of the Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other Related International Financial
Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Mission to Australia (7–11 February 2011) and Solomon Islands (14–18 February 2011), ¶¶ 94–97,
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/37/Add.1 (May 25, 2011) (by Cephas Lumina); Dev. Assistance
Comm., Organisation for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., DAC Action-Oriented Policy Paper on Human Rights
and Development 6 (2007) [hereinafter DAC Policy Paper on Human Rights], available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/7/39350774.pdf (noting that the human rights-based approach commonly
“feature[s] the integration of human rights principles—such as participation, inclusion and accountability—
into policies” and practices).
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all Haitians because human rights law recognizes the state as the primary duty
bearer.30 Furthermore,
It seeks full participation by requiring, among other things, that
information about aid is transparent and that the population is
routinely consulted—both in providing input on project design and in
ensuring necessary modifications to the projects to maximize the
realization of human rights. Transparency necessitates that
information about relief and rebuilding projects is easily accessible to
the community in a language known to them. It also requires paying
particular attention to groups that have been historically excluded
from the political process and have not had access to basic services.
[Additionally], in order to ensure respect for the rights of Haitians,
those providing assistance, including foreign donors, must be
accountable to the Haitian people. Accountability means that there
are effective mechanisms for all Haitians to make complaints, have
their complaints investigated and receive redress when their rights are
31
violated.

Finally, nondiscrimination entails affording particular attention to groups that
have been historically excluded from the political process and have not had
access to basic services.32
The key duty bearers in Haiti after the earthquake can be broken down into
three types of actors: (1) the Haitian government, which bears the primary duty
to respect, protect, and fulfill rights, but whose capacity is limited by resource
constraints and the devastation of the earthquake; (2) donor states, which have
committed substantial funding and resources critical to rebuilding and who
wield significant influence over how these resources are used; and (3) nonstate actors such as humanitarian agencies and NGOs, which are the recipients
of much of the aid (most of it governmental) and who provide many basic
services in Haiti that are usually provided by governments in other countries.
While the human rights obligations of the Haitian State are easily
ascertained, the legal obligations of the international community to adopt a
human rights-based approach are less defined. In the case of Haiti, the
obligations of the international community are particularly important. The
international community plays an unusually comprehensive role in Haiti

30 For a more detailed discussion of what the human rights-based approach means in practice in postearthquake Haiti, see A Call for Human Rights-Based Approach, supra note 15.
31 Right to Food, supra note 9, at 6–7.
32 Id.

CONCANNON&LINDSTROM GALLEYSFINAL3

1152

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

3/27/2012 8:15 AM

[Vol. 25

through funding, service delivery, policymaking, and peacekeeping, often
fulfilling roles traditionally served by the state. For these reasons, the
following Subparts focus on the duties of the international community in Haiti
and discuss the legal obligations of donor states and non-state actors to
implement a rights-based approach in their interventions in Haiti.
Understanding of the legal grounding for international assistance allows one to
shift away from a framework that focuses on humanitarian assistance as charity
toward a framework that is more accountable.
B. Obligations of Donor States
In the months following the earthquake, donor states came together and
pledged $4.6 billion to respond to the earthquake in Haiti.33 They also joined
with the Inter-American Development Bank, the UN Development Group, and
the World Bank to establish the Haiti Reconstruction Fund, aimed at pooling
and coordinating donor resources to reduce costs and duplication of efforts.34
The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (“IHRC”) was established in March
2010 to oversee the use of these funds.35 The IHRC was co-chaired by former
U.S. President Bill Clinton and Haiti’s Prime Minister.36 The IHRC’s powers
were approved under a controversial emergency law that allowed foreign
donors a strong voice in managing the earthquake response and
reconstruction—an allocation of authority viewed by some as an
unconstitutional encroachment on sovereignty.37 Donor states are thus playing
an unusually large and intrusive role in Haiti’s reconstruction. Although
opinions will differ as to the desirability of that enlarged role in the current
context, it is clear that, as donor states play this role, they have human rights
obligations to the people of Haiti.
While the Government of Haiti has the primary obligation to guarantee the
human rights of those under its jurisdiction, other states acting in Haiti have a
minimum duty to respect and protect human rights throughout their assistance
33 37.2 Percent Disbursement Rate for Haiti Recovery Among Bilateral and Multilateral Donors,
INTERIM HAITI RECOVERY COMM’N (Apr. 6, 2011), http://en.cirh.ht/analysis-disbursement.html.
34 HAITI RECONSTRUCTION FUND, REBUILDING TOGETHER: SIX MONTH PROGRESS REPORT: JUNE 17–
DECEMBER 16, 2010, at 5 (2011), available at http://www.haitireconstructionfund.org/hrf/sites/
haitireconstructionfund.org/files/lores_eng_rpt_spreads.pdf.
35 Joseph Guyler Delva, Haiti Approves Key Post-quake Reconstruction Body, REUTERS, Apr. 16, 2010,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/16/us-quake-haiti-reconstruction-idUSTRE63F39V20100
416.
36 Id.
37 See id.
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and interventions.38 A number of human rights documents that discuss
international cooperation toward the realization of rights contemplate that
human rights obligations extend beyond a state’s immediate borders and carry
over to their extraterritorial acts. The UN Charter commits states to take “joint
and separate action” to protect economic and social rights.39 This obligation to
cooperate internationally toward the realization of rights is reiterated in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”):
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-operation,
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate
40
means.

The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ESCR
Committee”) has reiterated this obligation in its comment on state obligations,
noting that “international co-operation for development and thus for the
realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States.
It is particularly incumbent upon those States which are in a position to assist
others in this regard.”41 The committee has also spelled out the content of such
international obligations with regard to the right to health42 and the right to
water.43 These instruments together foresee that states should and will take
action toward the realization of human rights beyond their own borders.

38

See U.N. Charter art. 56; supra note 13 and accompanying text.
U.N. Charter art. 56; see also Smita Narula, The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable
Under International Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 691, 730 (2006) (explaining the jurisdictional
extension under a human rights treaty).
40 ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 2(1) (emphasis added). As of July 2011, 160 countries had ratified the
ICESCR, and Haiti joined in ratifying it in 2012. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ch. IV, § 3, p. 1 [hereinafter
Parties to ICESCR], available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/
IV-3.en.pdf; Press Release, Bureau des Advocats Internationaux, Haiti Ratification of ICESCR (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://www.ijdh.org/archives/24763.
41 General Comment No. 3 (1990): The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Article 2, Paragraph 1 of
the Covenant), U.N. ECOSOCOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3, Annex III, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1990/8, at 87 (1991).
42 See Econ. & Soc. Council, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment 14 (2000): The Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) (explaining the obligations regarding health under the
ICESCR).
43 See U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights Obligations Related to Access to Safe Drinking Water and
Sanitation: Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/65/254 (Aug. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Safe Drinking
Water]; Econ. & Soc. Council, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant
39
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These and other national treaties that set out states’ human rights
obligations should guide states through their international development
policies and programming.44 For example, the Independent Expert on the Right
to Water, Catarina de Albuquerque, stressed that:
Development cooperation and assistance must be designed and
implemented in line with human rights standards and principles,
including the rights to water and sanitation and human rights
obligations regarding nondiscrimination, ensuring that there are
adequate and effective measures in place to identify and address any
45
negative impacts on human rights.

Haiti’s regional neighbors who are members of the Organization of
American States (“OAS”) have additional sources of obligations to implement
the rights-based approach. Among the core purposes of the OAS is the
promotion, through cooperative action, of economic and social development.46
Under the OAS Charter, Member States have obligations to work together for
economic, social, and cultural rights, particularly when a state is seriously
affected by conditions it cannot remedy alone.47 According to Article 26 of the
on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights: General Comment 15 (2002): The Right to Water (Articles. 11 & 12
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20,
2003) [hereinafter Gen. Comment 15]. See generally CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, NYU SCH.
OF LAW ET AL., WÒCH NAN SOLEY [ROCKS IN THE SUN]: THE DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO WATER IN HAITI (2008)
[hereinafter WÒCH NAN SOLEY], available at http://www.chrgj.org/projects/docs/wochnansoley.pdf
(explaining the rights to water in Haiti).
44 OHCHR, FAQS, supra note 14, at 16 (“[I]nternational human rights treaties should guide all
development cooperation and programming in all sectors and in all phases of the programming process.”).
45 Safe Drinking Water, supra note 43, ¶ 63(e).
46 The OAS Charter sets the eradication of extreme poverty as an essential purpose of the OAS. Charter
of the Organization of American States art. 2(g), opened for signature Apr. 30, 1948, O.A.S.T.S. No. 1-C, 119
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1951) [hereinafter OAS Charter], amended by Protocol of Amendment
to the Charter of the Organization of American States art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 14, 1992, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 1-E, 33 I.L.M. 1005 (entered into force Sept. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Protocol of Washington]. It declares,
“Inter-American cooperation for integral development is the common and joint responsibility of the Member
States” and “should include the economic, social, educational, [and] cultural . . . fields.” Id. art. 31, amended
by Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States art. 4, opened for signature
Dec. 5, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 66, 25 I.L.M. 529 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1988) [hereinafter Protocol of
Cartagena de Indias], further amended by Protocol of Washington, supra, art. 3. Notably, the charter specifies
the goals of ensuring basic survival rights such as food, nutrition, health, and sanitation. Id. art 34, amended by
Protocol of Washington, supra, arts. 2–3.
47 See id. art. 37, amended by Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American
States art. 8, opened for signature Feb. 27, 1967, O.A.S.T.S. No. 1-A, 721 U.N.T.S. 324 (entered into force
Feb. 27, 1970) [hereinafter Protocol of Buenos Aires], further amended by Protocol of Cartagena de Indias,
supra note 46, art. 6, further amended by Protocol of Washington, supra note 46, art. 3 (noting that Member
States agree to “join together in seeking a solution . . . whenever the economic development or stability of any
Member State is seriously affected by conditions that cannot be remedied through the efforts of that State”).

CONCANNON&LINDSTROM GALLEYSFINAL3

2011]

CHEAPER, BETTER, LONGER-LASTING

3/27/2012 8:15 AM

1155

convention, “States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both internally and
through international cooperation, especially those of an economic and
technical nature, with a view to achieving progressively . . . the full
realization” of fundamental rights under the OAS Charter.48 The formulation of
the duty makes clear that, in addition to their duties within their territories,
states should take cooperative steps that are aimed at fulfilling economic and
social rights within the hemisphere. These measures should be undertaken
progressively, that is, in a manner which constantly and consistently advances
toward the full realization of these rights. Following the earthquake, the
IACHR reminded the international community and implementing
organizations on the ground of “the importance of respecting international
human rights obligations in all circumstances, in particular non-derogable
rights and the rights of those most vulnerable.”49
Finally, there is a growing consensus among countries that the rights-based
approach is key to good and sustainable development practice.50 In 1993,
members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee committed to
develop “specific policies to guide their development co-operation with
reference to human rights.”51 Several countries have passed national legislation
that places human rights and the rights-based approach at the center of
development and international assistance.52 For example, Canada’s Official
Development Assistance Accountability Act 200853 requires a minister to
agree that the aid “is consistent with international human rights standards.”54

48 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 26, opened for
signature Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter
American Convention on Human Rights] (emphasis added).
49 Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Org. of Am. States, IACHR Stresses Duty To
Respect Human Rights During the Emergency in Haiti (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/
English/2010/11-10eng.htm.
50 See DAC Policy Paper on Human Rights, supra note 29, at 3.
51 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 25
(1995), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/13/31857685.pdf.
52 Examples of bilateral donors include Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. APPLYING A
HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH, supra note 22, at ii–iii, 15; see also DAC Policy Paper on Human Rights,
supra note 29, at 14.
53 Official Development Assistance Accountability Act, S.C. 2008, c. 17 (Can.).
54 Id. § 4(1)(c); UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY FOR HAITI, HAS AID CHANGED?:
CHANNELING ASSISTANCE TO HAITI BEFORE AND AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE 29 n.4 (2011) [hereinafter HAS AID
CHANGED?], available at http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/download/Report_Center/has_aid_changed_en.
pdf.
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The European Consensus on Development55 and the European Consensus on
Humanitarian Aid,56 which guide the European Commission’s aid, highlight
the importance of human rights to effective and equitable development.57
C. Obligations of Non-state Actors
In addition to donor governments, the formal humanitarian aid system is
made up of a wide array of non-state actors, including intergovernmental
organizations (“IGOs”) and NGOs.58 Haiti has a particularly large number of
non-state actors operating in the country. It is commonly referred to as the
“Republic of NGOs” and is believed to have one of the highest number of
NGOs per capita in the world.59 After the earthquake, humanitarian
organizations have been the primary service providers and often perform what
are otherwise considered traditional government functions.60 They command
enormous resources that often exceed the resources available to the
government ministries whose tasks they take on.61 Beyond mere service
provision, humanitarian agencies actively engage in governance and
policymaking.62 Disaster response in Haiti is organized through a cluster
system that seeks to coordinate humanitarian relief by bringing together UN
agencies and NGOs working in particular sectors.63 Only some of the clusters

55 Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States
Meeting Within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development
Policy: ‘The European Consensus,’ 2006 O.J. (C 46) 1.
56 Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States
Meeting Within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission, 2008 O.J. (C 25) 1.
57 See HAS AID CHANGED?, supra note 54, at 29 n.4.
58 See, e.g., Satterthwaite, supra note 4, at 880 (describing the makeup of the humanitarian aid system).
59 Madeline Kristoff & Liz Panarelli, Haiti: A Republic of NGOs? 1 (U.S. Inst. Of Peace, Peace Brief No.
23, 2010), available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%2023%20Haiti%20a%20Republic%20of%
20NGOs.pdf. The exact number of NGOs operating in Haiti is unknown due to the fact that most do not
register with the government due to the arduous nature of the process, despite legal requirements to do so. See
Mark Schuller, Invasion or Infusion?: Understanding the Role of NGOs in Contemporary Haiti, J. HAITIAN
STUD., Fall 2007, at 96, 98–99. In 2005, only 343 were registered with the government, id. at 99, but some
estimates show the number of pre-earthquake NGOs as high as 10,000. Kristoff & Panarelli, supra, at 1.
60 See Satterthwaite, supra note 4, at 935. IDP camps in Haiti are commonly managed by camp
management agencies, humanitarian NGOs that coordinate service provision including water provisions and
sanitation equipment and services. Id.
61 See id. at 880–82.
62 See id. at 935.
63 See Cluster Approach, ONERESPONSE, http://www.oneresponse.info/Coordination/ClusterApproach/
Pages/Cluster%20Approach.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2011).
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have a government presence,64 yet they play a large role in determining and
implementing post-disaster policies. For example, the Shelter Cluster in Haiti
after the earthquake is responsible for transitional housing65 and is, in effect,
determining the housing landscape and shelter options for displaced persons
over the next few years.66
The obligation of non-state actors to implement a rights-based approach
derives from both express commitments and implied duties. Efforts to
mainstream human rights in UN programming led the UN system to expressly
adopt a rights-based approach to development cooperation and programming.67
Key humanitarian charters that are meant to guide humanitarian assistance
assert the rights-based approach, including the important Sphere Minimum
Standards in Disaster Response.68 Many individual development and
humanitarian NGOs have also followed suit, including organizations active in
Haiti such as Oxfam and CARE.69

64

See ANDREA BINDER & FRANÇOIS GRÜNEWALD, INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM., HAITI: IASC
CLUSTER APPROACH EVALUATION, 2ND PHASE COUNTRY STUDY, APRIL 2010, at 48–57 (2010), available at
http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/gppi-urd-haiti-en.pdf.
65 Jessica Desvarieux, Haiti’s Homeless: Is ‘Transitional’ Housing the Solution?, TIME (July 16, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2004056,00.html.
66 The building of transitional wooden shelters (“t-shelters”) has been the most prominent approach to
providing housing to displaced persons after the earthquake. See Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator, U.S.
Dep’t of State, Shelter Solutions: Fast Facts on the U.S. Government’s Work in Haiti, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
(July 15, 2011), http://www.state.gov/s/hsc/rls/168715.htm [hereinafter Shelter Solutions]. Based on the
experience of lawyers at the BAI representing IDPs in need of adequate housing, access to t-shelters is the
preferred, and sometimes only housing alternative available to IDPs. See ROGER ANNIS ET AL., CAN. HAITI
ACTION NETWORK, CANADIAN FACT-FINDING DELEGATION REPORTS ON POST-EARTHQUAKE HAITI 6 (2011),
available at http://www.cooperinstitute.ca/sitefiles/File/Delegation-2011-report-August-4.pdf. These shelters
are meant to be temporary and are designed to last three years, Shelter Solutions, supra, but in light of the
sluggish pace of housing repairs and building of permanent housing, t-shelters are likely to constitute the
primary form of housing for IDPs for the foreseeable future.
67 See UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., DOCUMENTING LESSONS LEARNED FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED PROGRAMMING: AN ASIA-PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY,
PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING: UNDERTAKING A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH: A GUIDE FOR BASIC
PROGRAMMING 3 (2008), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0017/001791/179186e.pdf. UN
agencies including United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (“UNICEF”), United Nations
Development Fund for Women (“UNIFEM”), United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”), World
Health Organization (“WHO”), and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (“UNAIDS”) have
also expressly adopted the rights-based approach. See Dzodzi Tsikata, The Rights-Based Approach to
Development: Potential for Change or More of the Same?, IDS BULL., Oct. 2004, at 130, 130.
68 See Satterthwaite, supra note 4, at 873–74.
69 COOP. FOR ASSISTANCE & RELIEF EVERYWHERE, THE GLOBAL WATERS CRISIS: CARE’S PORTFOLIO
OF WATER PROGRAMS WORLDWIDE 2 (2006), available at http://www.care.org/careswork/whatwedo/health/
downloads/water_portfolio.pdf; OXFAM INT’L, TOWARDS GLOBAL EQUITY: STRATEGIC PLAN 2001–2004, at 7
(2001), available at http://english.oxfam.jp/about/strategicplan/strat_plan.pdf.
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Even those organizations that have not explicitly adopted a rights-based
approach as a guiding principle in their work have a minimum duty not to
violate human rights in their work. Non-state actors such as international
organizations are generally not parties to binding human rights treaties, but are
increasingly recognized as subjects of international law with the requisite legal
personality to be obliged to comply with the international legal system,
including human rights norms that rise to the level of customary international
law.70 The status of international organizations such as the International
Organization for Migration (“IOM”) as legal persons under international law
derives from their constituent instruments, through which states bestow on the
organizations legal personality.71 Once established, international organizations
are legal persons distinct from the states that created them and have legal
obligations to observe customary international law.72 Even when such
personality is not established de jure, “de facto legal personality can be
deduced from the powers and operations” of the entity.73 The International
Court of Justice has found that the UN has legal personality in the international
legal system because the UN “exercise[s] and enjoy[s] . . . functions and rights
which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure
of international personality and the capacity to operate upon an international
plane.”74 As a result, such international organizations are also bound by
international human rights law and should implement a rights-based approach

70 See HIGGINS, supra note 13, at 46–48. Under the traditional view of international law, this legal
framework governed the relations among nation-states and has states as its only subjects. See, e.g., id. at 39.
International law has since expanded to include non-state actors such as international organizations and
individuals among its subjects. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11) (finding legal personality for international organizations); TRIAL OF
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL (1947) (finding individuals
subject to international law).
71 HIGGINS, supra note 13, at 46. The IOM has legal personality by virtue of its own constitution, which
sets forth that the “Organization shall possess full juridical personality.” Constitution of the International
Organization for Migration art. 27, opened for signature Oct. 19, 1953, 1560 U.N.T.S. 440.
72 See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. at 178. While the
case does not define what is considered an international organization, legal scholarship has later defined it
broadly as “an autonomous entity, set up by a constituent instrument, which expresses its independent will
through common organs and has a capacity to act on an international plane.” Philippe Gautier, The Reparation
for Injuries Case Revisited: The Personality of the European Union, 4 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L.
331, 333 (2000) (presented as the lowest common denominator based on a survey of different legal scholars’
definitions).
73 JÄGERS, supra note 13, at 21.
74 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. at 179.
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in their practices as a means to ensure that they respect and protect human
rights in their practices.75
II. THE INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALE: THE NEED FOR A RIGHTS-BASED
APPROACH IN PRACTICE
The relevance of human rights in humanitarian emergencies is by no means
a new concept; using human rights to direct international assistance has been
accepted as best practice in the development discourse for at least a decade.76
Despite this, implementation of the rights-based approach is still far from
comprehensive, and commitments to human rights have been neglected in
humanitarian emergencies in Haiti.77 This has greatly reduced the effectiveness
and sustainability of recovery efforts and has created a context in which
Haitians are approached as passive beneficiaries rather than rights-holders,
reinforcing dependency on aid and reducing their agency. There are two key
practical reasons for using the rights-based approach in aid delivery: (1) Haiti’s
disproportionate vulnerability to disasters is a result of underlying human
rights violations which must be addressed in order for the humanitarian
response to be meaningful, and (2) the rights-based approach leads to longterm efficiency and sustainability of projects, making investments more
fruitful.
A. Human Rights Violations as Contributory Causes to Humanitarian
Emergencies
A brief look at Haiti’s recent history may cause one to lament Mother
Nature’s seeming obsession with inflicting suffering on the Haitian people. In
2008, four tropical cyclones slammed Haiti, dumping heavy rains that led to

75 The same principles have been applied to corporations and apply equally to other private entities such
as NGOs, provided that their powers and operations merit it. But see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
621 F.3d 111, 131–45 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (mem.).
76 See OHCHR, FAQS, supra note 14, at iii, 2, 35. The human rights-based approach emerged from a
commitment to mainstreaming of human rights through the UN’s operations, introduced in the 1990s. See id.
Numerous international organizations have since adopted the human rights-based approach as the key guiding
principle in their programming. See, e.g., BEVERLY BELL, OTHER WORLDS, FROM DISASTER AID TO
SOLIDARITY: BEST PRACTICES IN MEETING THE NEEDS OF HAITI’S EARTHQUAKE SURVIVORS 1 (2010);
OHCHR, FAQS, supra note 14, at iii.
77 See, e.g., Kaelin, supra note 7, at 1 (noting that more could have been and can be done to improve the
situation with decision-making driven by due regard to human rights implications).
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severe flooding.78 In January 2010, the earthquake deemed “the largest urban
natural catastrophe in recorded history” rocked Haiti.79 Then, while the country
was still reeling from the damage caused by the earthquake, cholera broke out
north of Port-au-Prince in late 2010.80 Placing the blame on Mother Nature,
however, obscures the fact that while the events themselves might be natural,
the devastating damage resulting from the disasters are anything but. These
three disasters are discussed below to illustrate how human rights violations
have made Haiti disproportionately vulnerable to natural disasters. The human
rights-based approach addresses these underlying causes and should be applied
to ensure a long-term reduction in vulnerability.
1. Storms, Flooding, and Socio-economic Rights
Haiti has a recent history of deadly storms and flooding that have led to
widespread loss of life and costly damage. In 2004, tropical storm Jeanne
swept over Haiti, causing major flooding and 2,500 deaths.81 Jeanne hit Puerto
Rico, the Dominican Republic, Barbados, and the United States as a hurricane,
killing thirty-four people in all those places combined.82 Jeanne was only a
tropical storm when it killed seventy times that number in Haiti.83 In 2008,
Haiti was again struck—by four storms in the same season that injured
hundreds and left more than 1,000 people dead or missing.84 The hurricanes
destroyed 22,702 homes and damaged another 84,625.85 In total, the hurricanes
affected an estimated 800,000 people.86 The floods wiped out seventy percent
of Haiti’s crops, resulting in severe malnutrition in subsequent months.87
Authorities estimate that the hurricanes’ total damage exceeded $1 billion.88

78 Jeffrey Masters, Hurricanes and Haiti: A Tragic History, WEATHER UNDERGROUND, http://www.
wunderground.com/hurricane/haiti.asp (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
79 Haiti: Six Months on, OFFICE FOR HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS. (July 30, 2010), http://www.
ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Haitisixmonthson.aspx.
80 Jonathan M. Katz, Cholera in Haiti Capital Confirmed, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 9, 2010, 8:04 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/09/cholera-in-haiti-capital-_n_780875.html.
81 Sylvana Nzirorera, One Year After Hurricane Jeanne, Recovery Continues, UNICEF (Sept. 18, 2005),
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/haiti_28308.html.
82 Gonaives, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/haiti/gonaives.htm
(last updated Feb. 8, 2011 8:44 PM).
83 Masters, supra note 78.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
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The recent devastation suffered from hurricanes and tropical storms is not a
result of Haiti’s location in a particularly unfortunate storm path;89
“[s]urprisingly, only six major Category 3 and stronger hurricanes have struck
Haiti since 1851.”90 Rather, it is a result of human-made rights violations that
make Haiti disproportionately vulnerable to flooding and damage resulting
therefrom. Deforestation has over time reduced Haiti’s ability to withstand
heavy rains, making it extremely vulnerable to flooding.91 Deforestation is, in
turn, a result of the inability of Haiti’s poor to enforce basic economic and
social rights.92 Most Haitians depend on wood and charcoal as their primary
fuel source, because the high costs of oil and other alternative fuel sources are
prohibitive.93 In addition to serving cooking needs, cutting down and selling
trees provides an alternative source of income for mountain farmers to buy
food and other basic necessities.94 But heavy deforestation has denuded
mountain slopes, allowing rainwater to wash down unimpeded.95 The farmers
know more intimately than the experts what happens when rain hits a
deforested slope, because the rain rushes away with the topsoil that is needed
for next year’s crop, which is many farmers’ only legacy for their children.96
Legacies and next year’s crop are of secondary relevance, however, when
children are dying now, and the farmer is left with little choice but to cut and
sell the tree to meet immediate needs of medicine and food.97
Back in 1980, Haiti still had twenty-five percent of its forests, allowing the
nation to withstand heavy rain events like 1979’s Category 3 Hurricane David
without loss of life.98 But as of 2004, only 1.4% of Haiti’s forests remained,

89 In fact, Haiti has a relatively protected location. Caribbean cyclones generally move from east to west,
and Haiti is the western one-third of the island of Hispaniola. The mass of the Dominican Republic, especially
its high mountains, weakens storms before they reach Haiti. See Hurricane Irene Strengthens to Category 2 on
Way to Bahamas, U.S., CNN (Aug. 22, 2011, 9:42 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/08/22/
tropical.weather.
90 Masters, supra note 78.
91 See id.
92 See id.
93 See Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, Inst. for Justice & Democracy in Haiti et al., Environmental
Justice [hereinafter Environmental Justice], in IJDH SUBMISSION TO THE UNHRC, supra note 9, at 58, 65.
94 Brian Concannon Jr., Another Unnatural Disaster, BOS. HAITIAN REP., Oct. 2004, reprinted in Brian
Concannon Jr., Another Unnatural Disaster, INST. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY HAITI (Jan. 28, 2010),
http://www.ijdh.org/archives/8452.
95 See id.
96 See id.
97 Id.
98 Masters, supra note 78.

CONCANNON&LINDSTROM GALLEYSFINAL3

1162

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

3/27/2012 8:15 AM

[Vol. 25

making it one of the most deforested countries in the world.99 When Jeanne
and Gordon struck Haiti, they were merely tropical storms, but they resulted in
devastating floods that killed thousands because of the near complete lack of
tree cover. As Jeffrey Masters notes, “it doesn’t even take a tropical storm to
devastate Haiti—in May of 2004, three days of heavy rains from a tropical
disturbance dumped more than 18 inches of rain in the mountains, triggering
floods that killed over 2600 people.”100
The failure of the Haitian government to protect even the most fundamental
rights necessary for survival is thus directly connected with the reliance on
deforestation to meet economic needs and the resulting vulnerability to
flooding. Under international law, the Government of Haiti has a legal
obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to food, and to ensure that it
is economically accessible.101 Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights102 (“UDHR”) guarantees a human being’s right to food and
freedom from hunger.103 The right is also articulated in the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”)104
and the Convention on the Rights to the Child (“CRC”)105 to which Haiti is a
party. Furthermore, Article 12 of the Protocol of San Salvador106 and Article
11 of the American Declaration107 both recognize the right to food. The right
was subsequently codified in Article 11 of the ICESCR.108 The ESCR
99

Environmental Justice, supra note 93, at 65; accord Masters, supra note 78.
Masters, supra note 78.
101 See Econ. & Soc. Council, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights: General Comment 12 (Twelfth Session, 1999): The Right to
Adequate Food (Article 11), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999).
102 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10,
1948).
103 See id. art 25.
104 CEDAW, supra note 13, art. 12(2) (recognizing the right of pregnant and lactating women to food and
nutrition).
105 Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24(2)(c), opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 20, 1990) [hereinafter CRC] (recognizing the right of children to adequate
food and clean drinking water).
106 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights art. 12, opened for signature Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, 28 I.L.M. 161 (entered
into force Nov. 16, 1999).
107 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth
International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human
Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992); see also The Right to Food
in National Constitutions, in FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE RIGHT TO FOOD: IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 42 (2008), available at http://www.fao.org/Legal/rtf/booklet.pdf.
108 ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 11. This encompasses two separate but related norms: the right to
adequate food and the right to be free from hunger. See LORENZO COTULA & MARGARET VIDAR, FOOD &
100
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Committee has established that a minimum core of economic, social, and
cultural rights are customary international law and are thus binding on all
states, regardless of whether they have signed or ratified treaties protecting
those rights.109
Violations of the right to food are not the responsibility of the Haitian
government alone, however.110 In the 1980s, Haiti was a net exporter of
agricultural produce.111 The agricultural sector collapsed, however, after the
International Monetary Fund imposed structural adjustments that required
Haiti to decrease subsidies on domestic rice and remove tariffs on imported
staples.112 Under pressure from the United States, Haiti also had to slash tariffs
from 45–50 percent, down to 0–15 percent.113 Without this protection, Haitian
farmers could not compete with subsidized U.S. agricultural goods, and
imports from the United States flooded the Haitian markets.114 Former
President Bill Clinton recently publicly acknowledged that this policy was a
mistake that only benefited farmers in the United States.115 Today, Haiti suffers
from a food deficit and is highly dependent on foreign sources such as imports

AGRIC. ORG., THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD IN EMERGENCIES 4–5 (2002), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/
docrep/fao/005/y4430E/y4430E00.pdf.
109 Econ. & Soc. Council, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17
of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, ¶ 31,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90 (June 26, 2003) (“[B]asic economic, social and cultural rights, as part of the
minimum standards of human rights, are guaranteed under customary international law.”); see also WÒCH NAN
SOLEY, supra note 43, at 45.
110 Right to Food, supra note 9, at 76 (footnotes omitted); see also Beverly Bell, “Miami Rice”: The
Business of Disaster in Haiti, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 9 2010, 3:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
beverly-bell/miami-rice-the-business-o_b_794504.html; Mark Doyle, US Urged To Stop Haiti Rice Subsidies,
BBC NEWS (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11472874; Nathanial Gronewold,
Post-quake Revitalization Plans Collide in Haiti’s Breadbasket, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/03/08/08greenwire-post-quake-revitalization-plans-collide-in-hai-15994.
html; Haiti No Longer Grows Much of Its Own Rice and Families Now Go Hungry, OXFAM INT’L (June 2008),
http://www.oxfam.org/development/haiti-no-longer-grows-much-its-own-rice-and-families-now-go-hungry;
Jonathan M. Katz, With Cheap Food Imports, Haiti Can’t Feed Itself, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 20, 2010, 2:13
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/20/with-cheap-food-imports-h_n_507228.html; Bill Quigley,
The U.S. Role in Haiti’s Food Crisis, COUNTERPUNCH (Apr. 21, 2008), http://www.counterpunch.org/
quigley04212008.html.
111 Right to Food, supra note 9.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
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and aid to meet its food needs.116 Difficulties in meeting basic food needs have
contributed to the deforestation problem.
International trade policies have thus contributed to Haiti’s vulnerability, in
violation of countries’ extranational obligations to respect, protect, and
facilitate the right to food.117 International aid has also been a culprit for
destabilizing Haiti’s food market ultimately hindering long-term access to
food. A 2010 report by the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice & Human
Rights focusing on the impact of U.S. food aid on access to food in Haiti found
that food aid can be harmful to the sustainability and availability of local food
for purchase, interfering with the realization of Haitians’ human rights and
long-term economic stability.118 In particular, when foreign-grown food is
either distributed for free or sold at a subsidized price, such aid may make it
difficult for local food producers to compete with the imported food.119 At
times it has also led farmers to abandon agricultural production because it is no
longer lucrative. Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes stressed that a
“combination of food aid, but also cheap imports have . . . resulted in a lack of
investment in Haitian farming, and that has to be reversed.”120 International
cooperation in Haiti must seek to address violations of the right to food in
order to deal with the root causes of flooding disasters.
2. The January 12 Earthquake and the Right to Housing
While the tremors that crumbled much of Haiti’s central infrastructure on
January 12, 2010, were a natural phenomenon, the disproportionate
consequences of the earthquake were also direct results of policy choices and a
failure to enforce human rights. In the aftermath of the earthquake, the Haitian
government noted that the toll did not result from the tremor alone, but from
“an excessively dense population, a lack of adequate building standards, the

116 See Haiti Emergency, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, http://www.wfp.org/crisis/haiti (last visited Nov.
14, 2011) (describing the food crisis in Haiti).
117 Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Economic, Social & Cultural Rights: The Right to Food:
Rep. Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food in Accordance with Commission on Human
Rights Resolution 2002/25, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/54 (Jan. 10, 2003) (by Jean Zielger); see also Narula,
supra note 39, at 725.
118 See CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & JUSTICE, NYU SCH. OF LAW ET AL., SAK VID PA KANPE [EMPTY SACK
DOES NOT STAND UP]: THE IMPACT OF U.S. FOOD AID ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI 1, 6 (2010), available at
http://www.rfkcenter.org/files/RTF_Briefing.pdf.
119 See Katz, supra note 110.
120 Id.
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disastrous state of the environment, disorganized land use, and an unbalanced
division of economic activity.”121 Decades of national and international
policies and weak rule of law created a vulnerability of Haitians that resulted in
astronomical displacement and death tolls that far exceed the mortality in
earthquakes of comparable scale in other countries.122
Violations of the right to housing in Haiti directly contributed to the human
toll of the quake. The right to housing is a necessary component of the right to
an adequate standard of living. Article 25 of the UDHR provides that
“[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care.”123 The ICESCR establishes the right “of everyone to an
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate
food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living
conditions.”124 Other international agreements to which Haiti is a party also
incorporate the right to housing either expressly or implicitly, including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),125 the CRC,126
and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.127
Nondiscrimination with regard to housing is also recognized by CEDAW128

121 GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI, ACTION PLAN FOR NATIONAL RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
HAITI 5 (2010), available at http://www.haiticonference.org/Haiti_Action_Plan_ENG.pdf [hereinafter HAITI,
ACTION PLAN].
122 See, e.g., Kaelin, supra note 7, at 2 (“Not least due to the massive urban planning deficits, the
earthquake wreaked such enormous destruction.”).
123 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 102, art. 25(1).
124 ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 11(1).
125 “Homelessness has been found to threaten violations of the right to life and forced evictions have been
found to contravene the right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference with the home.” Camp
Benediction et al., Right to Housing [hereinafter Right to Housing], in IJDH SUBMISSION TO THE UNHRC,
supra note 9, at 101, 110 n.4.
126 CRC, supra note 105, art. 27(3) (“State Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their
means, shall take appropriate measure to assist parents and others responsible for the child to implement this
right and shall in the case of need provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly with
regards to nutrition, clothing and housing.”).
127 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 28(1), opened for signature Dec. 13, 2006,
2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008) [hereinafter CRPD] (“States Parties recognize the right of
persons with disabilities to an adequate standard of living for themselves and their families, including adequate
food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions, and shall take appropriate
steps to safeguard and promote the realization of this right without discrimination on the basis of disability.”).
128 CEDAW, supra note 13, art. 14(2)(h) (“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, that
they participate in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall ensure to such women the
right: . . . (h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and
water supply, transport and communications.”).
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and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (“CERD”).129
The right to adequate housing includes elements of habitability,
affordability, physical security, and security of tenure.130 In stark contrast, “a
majority of Haitians live[d] in overpopulated urban centers, shantytowns or
under-developed villages that fail[ed] to meet minimum standards of
habitability” and security.131 Housing conditions in Haiti are directly linked to
the conditions of extreme poverty:
Before the earthquake, an estimated eighty percent of the population
was formally unemployed, and most people eked out a meager living
as manual laborers or service providers in the underground economy.
Few Haitians could afford to own a home, so the majority lived in
132
shoddy rental units or informal settlements on open land.

Overpopulation made matters worse by creating a severe housing shortage
in the nation’s urban centers after the agricultural sector collapsed in the 1980s.
Farmers who lost their livelihoods after U.S. agricultural goods flooded
Haitian markets migrated to Port-au-Prince in search of employment.133 The
U.S. Agency for International Development pushed a policy to concentrate the
population in cities in order to promote assembly manufacture. As described in
a stakeholder report on the right to housing, submitted for Haiti’s Universal
Periodic Review:134
The city, once home to 250,000 people, grew to 3 million.
Construction proceeded without regard for building codes or safety
standards, and poor urban planning resulted in neighborhoods being

129 CERD, supra note 13, art. 5(e)(iii) (“In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in
article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its
forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin,
to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: . . . (e) Economic, social and
cultural rights, in particular: . . . (iii) The right to housing.”).
130 General Comment No. 4 (1991): The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1) of the Covenant), U.N.
ECOSOCOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 3, Annex III, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1991/4, at 114 (1992).
131 Right to Housing, supra note 125, at 102.
132 Id.
133 INT’L COMM. OF NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD ET AL., UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: SUBMISSION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS PERIODIC REVIEW: THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN
COLUMBIA, HAITI AND PUERTO RICO 6 (2010), available at http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/default/files/
declaration-treaty/Foreign_Policy_Joint_Report_USA.pdf; Kaelin, supra note 7, at 2.
134 See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., TOWARDS AN URBAN FUTURE: A DRAFT REPORT: AN ASSESSMENT
OF ISSUES AND TRENDS 7–8 (2011), available at http://www.citiesalliance.org/ca/sites/citiesalliance.org/files/
CA_Images/Executive%20Summary%20IRG%20Urban%20Report.pdf.
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established in areas prone to flooding and other natural hazards,
including steep hill-sides that collapsed in the earthquake. Following
an assessment in 2009, United Nations officials concluded that the
Haitian government had lost the capacity to manage metropolitan
Port au Prince.
The earthquake struck less than one year later, killing up to
250,000 people. It displaced an additional two million, and few of
them had the resources to secure alternative housing outside the
135
affected area.

Most of these people were killed as buildings crumbled over them, a result of
decades of building with poor materials and non-enforcement of building
codes.136 The quake disproportionately impacted the poor by destroying
buildings in lower middle class neighborhoods and poor neighborhoods
constructed in ravine areas.137 The impact of poverty and unsafe housing on
death tolls is made clear when Haiti’s mortality is compared to that of other
countries shaken by quakes of a similar or greater scale. By comparison,
prosperous Chile was struck by an earthquake in February 2010 that claimed
fewer than 600 lives but was about 500 times more powerful than the 7.0
magnitude convulsion in Haiti.138 Japan’s 2011 earthquake registered a 9.0
magnitude, exponentially stronger than even Chile’s, but relatively few people
seem to have perished from the tremor itself thanks to Japan’s famed
emergency preparedness and construction standards.139
3. The Cholera Epidemic and the Right to Water
Ten months after the earthquake left more than a million people to survive
in precarious sanitation situations, cholera broke out in central Haiti.140
Cholera represents a grave and continuing threat to the hundreds of thousands
of displaced persons still living in camps that often lack access to clean water
and toilets and to the majority of Haitians that live in rural areas far from water
135

Right to Housing, supra note 125, at 102.
See Tom Watkins, Problems with Haiti Building Standards Outlined, CNN (Jan. 13, 2010),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-13/world/haiti.construction_1_building-code-haiti-earthquake.
137 See Kaelin, supra note 7, at 2.
138 See More Than 2 Million Affected by Earthquake, Chile’s President Says, CNN (Feb. 27, 2010),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-02-27/world/chile.quake_1_magnitude-haiti-quake-chilean-president-michellebachelet.
139 See Carol J. Williams, Japan Earthquake, Tsunami Death Toll Rises to 1,000, Reports Say, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 11, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/11/world/la-fgw-japan-quake-death-toll-20110312.
140 Cholera Confirmed in Haiti, October 21, 2010, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/haiticholera/situation (last updated Oct. 22, 2010).
136
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infrastructure, hospitals, and clinics.141 For cholera, a disease that is
waterborne and kills by dehydration, access to clean water is imperative to
both prevention and treatment.
The source of the epidemic has been traced back to the Artibonite River, a
critical water source for much of central Haiti.142 Residents of the region rely
on the river for bathing, washing, drinking, and irrigation. The river was
contaminated by fecal matter introduced from a UN peacekeeping base seated
at a tributary to the Artibonite River.143 By early 2011, as Haiti mourned the
anniversary of the earthquake, more than 4,000 people had died from cholera
and more than 200,000 cases had been recorded.144 The cholera outbreak is
only the most recent and urgent symptom of a larger and ongoing violation of
the right to water in Haiti. Despite rigorous public awareness campaigns
seeking to educate people on the need to drink treated water, cholera spread in
large part because of a lack of access to treated or potable water.145 Studies
conducted in 2006 found that “only 55.2 percent of the population has access
to an improved water source, while close to 70 percent does not have direct
access to potable water.”146 These figures almost definitely overstate access to
improved water sources because public systems are highly dysfunctional and

141 Haiti Aid Group Warns of Cholera Surge on Eve of Rainy Season, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2012), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/americas/haiti-aid-group-warns-of-cholera-surge-on-eve-of-rainy-season/
2012/02/24/glQAg7bvXR_story.html.
142 See ALEJANDO CRAVIOTO, INT’L CTR. FOR DIARRHOEAL DISEASE RESEARCH, FINAL REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT PANEL OF EXPERTS ON THE CHOLERA OUTBREAK IN HAITI 18, 30 (2011) [hereinafter HAITI
CHOLERA FINAL REPORT], available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/UN-cholera-report-final.pdf.
143 In May 2011, a UN-commissioned panel of experts released the results of an independent
investigation, which found that “the evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the source of the
Haiti cholera outbreak was due to contamination . . . as a result of human activity.” Id. at 29. More specifically,
the outbreak was caused by the “contamination of the Meye Tributary of the Artibonite River with a
pathogenic strain of the current South Asian type Vibrio cholerae.” Id.
144 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, HAITI: CHOLERA
SITUATION REPORT #35: 4 FEBRUARY 2011, at 1 (2011), available at http://haiti.humanitarianresponse.info/
Portals/0/OCHA Haiti _Cholera Sitrep_35.pdf.
145 Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Q&A: Dr. Paul Farmer and Ophelia Dahl on Recovery Efforts in Haiti, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2011, 8:35 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/01/haiti-cholera-earthquake-drpaul-farmer-ophelia-dahl.html (“You can spend half your resources telling people to wash their hands or drink
clean water, but if they don’t have access to clean water, it’s a peculiarly noxious way of approaching the
problem.”); Beatrice Lindstrom, Law in the Time of Cholera: Violations of the Right to Water in Haiti,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2011, 11:42 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/beatrice-lindstrom/law-in-thetime-of-choler_b_812170.html.
146 WÒCH NAN SOLEY, supra note 42, at 15 (citation omitted). Fifty-three percent of the population in
urban areas had access to an improved water source and fifty-two percent in rural areas. Water and Sanitation,
OFF. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR HAITI, http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/about-haiti/water-sanitation/ (last visited
Nov. 14, 2011).
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in some communities rarely available year round.147 As reported by the World
Bank, “[i]n almost all urban areas water supply is intermittent,” and in rural
areas, water is very difficult to access during the dry season.148
Haiti has international human rights obligations to respect, protect, and
fulfill the rights to water and sanitation. The minimum core obligations in
relation to the right to water are binding on Haiti under customary international
law.149 The right to water entitles individuals to water that is sufficient in
quantity, safe in quality, acceptable in taste and odor, physically accessible,
available, and affordable.150 In July 2010, the UN General Assembly
recognized the right to water and sanitation as a separate human right “that is
essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights,”151 and the UN
Human Rights Council affirmed the legally binding nature of this right.152 The
UN Independent Expert on the Right to Water has emphasized that
“[s]anitation and water must be prioritized by according greater political
priority to these sectors, which should be reflected in allocations in State
budgets and donor commitments.”153 The right to water is also protected in
relation to specific populations in CEDAW154 and the CRC.155
Like with the right to food, however, the responsibility for the failure to
respect the right to clean water does not lie with the Haitian government alone.
In 1998, the government had the opportunity and commitment to make drastic
improvements to its water supply system when the Inter-American
Development Bank (“IDB”) approved a $54-million loan aimed to improve
potable water and sanitation services.156 The IDB estimated that the loan would

147

WÒCH NAN SOLEY, supra note 43, at 15.
Id. (quoting WORLD BANK, PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT ON A PROPOSED GRANT IN THE AMOUNT
OF SDR 3.4 MILLION (US$5 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI FOR A RURAL WATER AND
SANITATION PROJECT 28 (2006), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContent
Server/WDSP/IB/2007/01/05/000020953_20070105093521/Rendered/PDF/38080.pdf).
149 See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
150 General Comment 15, supra note 43, at 2; see also UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL., THE
RIGHT TO WATER: FACTSHEET NO. 35, at 34–35 (2010), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/FactSheet35en.pdf.
151 The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc A/RES/64/292 (Aug. 3,
2010).
152 Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, H.R.C. Res. 15/9, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc
A/HRC/RES/15/9 (Oct. 6, 2010).
153 Safe Drinking Water, supra note 43, ¶ 63(c).
154 CEDAW, supra note 13, art. 14(2)(h).
155 CRC, supra note 105, art. 24(2)(c).
156 WÒCH NAN SOLEY, at 43, at iii.
148
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decrease water costs for the poor by up to ninety percent.157 On the eve of its
dispersal, however, the United States blocked the loan.158 Internal
communications obtained under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act revealed
that the interference was motivated by a policy designed to limit support for
Haiti’s democratically elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide because of his
left-wing policies, which were seen as contrary to U.S. interests in the
region.159 Such political considerations are in direct violation of the IDB’s
Articles of Agreement, but, with significant voting power, the United States
succeeded in stopping the loan dispersal, considerably undermining the
opportunity for the Haitian government to develop the water infrastructure.160
The cholera outbreak itself is also evidence of the need for the international
community to adhere to human rights in their assistance and interventions in
Haiti. A report issued by a UN-commissioned panel of experts found that the
cholera pathogen was introduced in fecal matter that likely leaked from a UN
base that had a negligently maintained sanitation system with broken pipes
carrying significant risk for contamination.161 The report found significant
evidence tracing the source of the cholera outbreak back to UN malfeasance.162
The panel found that the outbreak originated near a UN peacekeeping base,
where the sanitation system was negligently maintained, and broken pipes
created a “significant potential for [fecal] contamination.”163 The base also
dumped waste in an unfenced pit that regularly overflowed into a nearby
tributary to the Artibonite River, Haiti’s central water source.164 The UN’s
negligent waste management in an environment already vulnerable to
waterborne disease has led to an arbitrary deprivation of life for thousands of
Haitians and amounts to a gross violation of human rights in itself.
B. Implementation of the Rights-Based Approach Post-earthquake: Lost
Opportunities To Enhance the Impact of Humanitarian Efforts
The previous Subpart has demonstrated that systemic economic and social
rights violations create an environment susceptible to disproportionate damage

157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id.
Id.
See id. at 11.
See id.
HAITI CHOLERA FINAL REPORT, supra note 142, at 21.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
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from natural disasters. The rights-based approach reduces the underlying
vulnerability by analyzing and addressing root causes of poverty and disasters,
rather than simply responding to the immediate results thereof. Another key
practical benefit of the rights-based approach is that it enhances the success of
the humanitarian response itself because it leads to higher efficiency and
sustainability of projects. By engaging critical stakeholders, the rights-based
approach ensures that aid is delivered in a manner that is consistent with the
recipient government’s national development priorities, and ensures that efforts
are not duplicating existing national programs. When properly implemented,
this framework enables the beneficiaries to play an active role in the
development of their country to express their priorities, make demands on their
government and donors, have a say in how those demands are met (how
projects are designed and implemented), and ensure that there are effective
methods for communities to communicate with donors and implementing
agencies to report problems or concerns.165 The rights-based approach also
helps to promote the sustainability of development work by “empowering
people themselves—especially the most marginalized—to participate in policy
formulation and hold accountable those who have a duty to act.”166 Through
participation, a proper implementation of the rights-based approach ensures
that projects meet the needs of rights-holders and are delivered in a way that is
sensitive to the specific needs and attributes of the community. This, in turn,
enables projects to contribute to durable solutions that can be continued after
funding runs out and aid agencies leave.
The rights-based approach is accepted as a positive practice within the
humanitarian community in Haiti. In a recent study on the humanitarian
community’s use of rights-based indicators to guide their work in Haiti after
the earthquake, Professor Margaret Satterthwaite surveyed “[o]ne hundred
thirty-eight respondents . . . working in the humanitarian or development field
and having worked full-time in or in relation to Haiti at some point during the
preceding two years.”167 “A striking 85 percent of [the respondents] reported
using a rights-based approach in Haiti,”168 and ninety-six percent of
respondents said that the rights-based approach improves the impact of their
work.169 Several respondents underscored the importance of the rights-based

165
166
167
168
169

See OHCHR, FAQS, supra note 14, at 17.
Id. at 15.
Satterthwaite, supra note 4, at 877.
Id.
Id. at 879.
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approach in the Haitian context, in particular “one opined that the rights-based
approach was important following five hundred years of ‘rights-violation based
approaches,’ while several others pointed to the failure of past international
interventions in Haiti as underlining the need for the rights-based approach.”170
In practice, implementation of the rights-based approach has been spotty at
best.
This Subpart discusses implementation in each of the five pillars of the
rights-based approach: capacity building, participation, transparency,
accountability, and nondiscrimination. It uses examples from experiences in
post-earthquake Haiti to illustrate the shortcomings in implementation and
show how a failure to implement the rights-based approach has led to a less
successful humanitarian response. This Subpart does not strive to be a holistic
evaluation of the extent to which the rights-based approach has been
implemented, but rather seeks to demonstrate the importance of
implementation to highlight the instrumental value of the approach.
1. Capacity Building
Human rights law recognizes the state as the primary duty-bearer
responsible for respecting, protecting, and fulfilling human rights. The core
human rights treaties apply to and create obligations for state actors,171 and
national authorities have the principal duty and responsibility to provide
protection and humanitarian assistance to IDPs.172 As such, the rights-based
approach focuses on building the capacity of the state to realize the human
rights of all Haitians. Haiti’s recovery from the earthquake is significantly
delayed by two factors: the impact of the disaster on the government itself and
the weak public infrastructure that predated the earthquake. The earthquake
was particularly devastating because it struck so near the capital, incapacitating
the central government. Critical governmental institutions crumbled including
the presidential palace, parliament, law courts, and most ministerial and public
administration buildings.173 The public sector suffered heavy human losses
170

Id. at 945–46 (citation omitted).
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
172 Representative of the Secretary-General, Further Promotion & Encouragement of Human Rights &
Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme & Methods of Work of the Commission:
Human Rights, Mass Exoduses & Displaced Persons: Rep. of the Representative of the Secretary-General,
Submitted Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1997/39: Addendum: Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, Annex I, § 1, princ. 3(1), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998).
173 HAITI, ACTION PLAN, supra note 121, at 7; see also UNITED NATIONS, HAITI: 6 MONTHS AFTER . . ., at
3 (2010), http://www.undp.org/haiti/doc/Haiti_6months_after.pdf.
171
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(thousands of civil servants died).174 Yet the Haitian government’s limited
capacity to respond to this and other natural disasters also stems from a long
history of intentional disempowerment by the international community. The
lack of institutional capacity emanates from a combination of interrelated
factors: limited resources resulting from a history of debt service; international
trade and aid policies that have hindered national production; autocratic leaders
who, often with foreign support, have used the national treasury to boost
personal wealth; and the international community’s deliberate undermining
and overthrowing of the government that most aggressively worked to provide
basic governmental services to the population.175
The structure and delivery of international assistance in Haiti has often
reinforced the weak capacity of the state rather than supported its capacity to
fulfill its role as primary duty-bearer. Non-state actors in Haiti have habitually
worked outside the government framework, and international financing has
been directed to NGOs rather than government entities.176 Despite being one of
the major sources of bilateral aid to Haiti, the United States has a long history
of bypassing the Haitian government with its funds. In 2000, the U.S.
government imposed a complete aid embargo on Haiti, openly committing to
suspending all aid to the Haitian government while continuing to fund NGOs
that were viewed as “suitably complicit,” or more in line with U.S. political
interests.177 The embargo was enacted to pressure the Haitian government to
change the results of the May 2000 legislative elections,178 and the impact has
crippled the government. Political philosopher Peter Hallward and economist
Jeffrey Sachs observed that “[t]he effect of the US aid embargo, in short, was
to slice [then President] Aristide’s miniscule spending-power roughly in half,”
interrupting the provision of basic services and draining foreign exchange
reserves, which led to the collapse of the exchange rate, a rise in inflation, and
the collapse of the economy.179

174

HAITI, ACTION PLAN, supra note 121, at 7; see also UNITED NATIONS, supra note 173, at 3.
See generally PAUL FARMER, THE USES OF HAITI (3d ed. 2006).
176 Hartberg, supra note 10, at 11.
177 PETER HALLWARD, DAMMING THE FLOOD: HAITI AND THE POLITICS OF CONTAINMENT 82 (2007).
178 See id. (“[A]fter May, all US aid to the Haitian government was suspended, and the new US
ambassador, Dean Curran, was instructed to tell [President] Aristide on the eve of his inauguration that the US
would not normalize relations until the ‘problems with the May elections are resolved.’ A year into Aristide’s
second administration—and long after Aristide had duly resolved these ‘problems’—USAID official Sharon
Bean admitted to Timothy Pershing and other journalists that Aristide’s administration ‘would never receive a
dime of American aid.’” (citations omitted)).
179 Id. at 83.
175
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In 2007, only three percent of bilateral aid to Haiti went to budget support
of the government.180 The international community began to recognize the
grave consequences of bypassing the government and has, in recent donors
conferences, made renewed commitments to supporting the Haitian State.181
Despite these pledges, the earthquake response has continued the old tradition
of supporting non-state actors over the government. The UN Office of the
Special Envoy for Haiti surveyed official aid to Haiti after the earthquake and
found that only one percent of earthquake relief aid went to the Haitian
government.182 The majority of aid circumvented public institutions in favor of
foreign non-state actors such as NGOs and private contractors.183 While the
statistics for recovery aid show improvements, the bigger portion of aid still
bypasses the government.184 The special envoy’s report concludes that the
allocation of aid demonstrates that the use of aid to Haiti has not changed since
the earthquake and that the effect of circumventing of Haitian public
institutions is to render government leadership in recovery “impossible.”185
The structure of assistance to Haiti also reinforces the government’s
exclusion from decision-making. As described in this Subpart, humanitarian
assistance in Haiti is organized through a cluster system that groups NGOs and
international agencies by sector.186 It is important for the state to maintain
standards and mechanisms to oversee the activities of the various actors
working in Haiti to ensure that their actions are effective and do not undermine

180

HAS AID CHANGED?, supra note 54, at 8.
See Haiti, Donors Facing Huge Task To ‘Build Back Better,’ DAILY HERALD (Mar. 28, 2010, 11:42
PM), http://www.thedailyherald.com/regional/2-news/2047-haiti-donors-facing-huge-task-to-build-back-better
(providing an overview of March 2010’s Build Back Better conference); Bryan Schaaf, The Prime Minister’s
New Paradigm for Haiti, HAITI INNOVATION (June 21, 2009), http://haitiinnovation.org/en/2009/06/
22/prime-ministers-new-paradigm-haiti (describing June 2010’s conference at which Prime Minister Pierre
Louis presented his plan for rebuilding Haiti).
182 HAS AID CHANGED?, supra note 54, at 14.
183 Id. at 15.
184 Id. (finding that fifty-nine percent of recovery aid went to private institutions).
185 Id. at 2.
186 See BINDER & GRÜNEWALD, supra note 64, at 20–21. This evaluation found that the cluster system:
181

[E]nhanced partnership between the UN and other international humanitarian actors, facilitated
information sharing, improved the predictability of leadership, limited duplications and enhanced
coherence. At the same time, the evaluators found a number of important shortcomings of the
cluster [approach] in Haiti: it was weak on ownership and connectedness, demonstrated only a
low level of accountability—both toward the Humanitarian Coordinator and affected
populations—and could not significantly improve coverage. The report shows that the cluster
approach in Haiti has not realized its full potential.
Id. at 7.
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human rights, but the government has not been sufficiently empowered in the
management and leadership of these clusters, due in part to practical
obstacles187 or language barriers that hinder meaningful participation.188
Evaluations of the cluster system have called for improvement in the interface
between the government and cluster system, but have not led to significant
change.189 While the IHRC was established in 2010 to improve coordination
between donors and the government and support the capacity of the Haitian
government, success was limited.190 Due in large part to weaknesses in staff
capacity, the IHRC has not done enough to include government and Haitian
stakeholder participation.
The lack of government leadership in the earthquake response is a critical
barrier to recovery. The Government of Haiti must play a larger role in the
relief effort by being more active in governance, making active decisions based
on national priorities, leading the international community, and leading the
protection of vulnerable populations. It must also assist in resettlement and in
the enactment of national policies on housing and relocation. The humanitarian
community has pointed to the lack of responsiveness from the Prèval
government as one of the main barriers to effective reconstruction.191 Yet
focusing attention solely on the human rights obligations of the host state in a
disaster setting can ignore those actors that are in a critical position to impact
human rights and the responsibility that the international community has to
support the capacity of public institutions. Opportunities to do so exist at every
level—from national to local, and as noted by Oxfam in their earthquake
anniversary report: “Whatever the weaknesses of the Haitian government, it
remains the sovereign authority whose engagement is essential if relief,
reconstruction, and development in Haiti are to be successful.”192 Two years
after the earthquake, many humanitarian agencies have reached the end of their
earthquake relief mandate, making it necessary to transition essential service

187 “For example, many clusters have met on MINUSTAH’s Logistics Base located on the outskirts of
Port-au-Prince, which is not easily accessible.” Right to Food, supra note 9, at 85 n.85.
188 “Some cluster meetings are held in English, not French or Creole, effectively excluding participation
by government officials and Haitian civil society.” Id. at 85 n.86
189 ABHIJIT BHATTACHARJEE & ROBERTA LOSSIO, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, EVALUATION OF OCHA RESPONSE TO HAITI EARTHQUAKE 10–12 (2011), available
at http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Evaluation%20of%20OCHA%20Response%20to%20the%20Haiti
%20Earthquake.pdf.
190 Right to Food, supra note 9, at 79.
191 See id. at 78.
192 Hartberg, supra note 10, at 4.
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provision and decision-making back to the state.193 Given the lack of support
the government has received to build up its capacity, it is unclear how this will
be executed.
2. Participation
The human-rights based approach requires “active, free, and meaningful”
participation from all parts of Haitian society, including impacted
communities, grassroots organizations, minorities, rural populations, and
women.194 Perfunctory contact with program beneficiaries does not constitute
adequate and meaningful participation.195 As Amanda M. Klasing, P. Scott
Moses, and Satterthwaite discuss, the right to participation in decision-making
and democratic life is a vital human rights principle.196 The UDHR specifically
provides for the right to political participation.197 It includes the right to
participate in government and extends to equal access to public service and
participation in the cultural life of the community,198 encompassing a broad
range of rights necessary for the meaningful participation of those affected by
policies and decisions. The right to participation should be considered in the
context of all the rights contained within the UDHR.199 While the UDHR is in
itself non-binding, many of its principles are encompassed in binding human
rights treaties, including the ICCPR and the ICESCR.200
193 See INTERIM HAITI RECOVERY COMM’N, ABOUT THE INTERIM HAITI RECOVERY COMMISSION: IHRC–
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 17 (2010), available at http://en.cirh.ht/files/pdf/about_ihrc.pdf.
194 A Call for Human Rights-Based Approach, supra note 15.
195 Id.
196 See Amanda M. Klasing et al., Measuring the Way Forward in Haiti: Grounding Disaster Relief in the
Legal Framework of Human Rights, 13 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J., 1, 14 (2011).
197 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 99, arts. 21–22; Klasing et al., supra note 186, at
14.
198 See Klasing et al., supra note 196, at 14.
199 Id. at 14 (citation omitted) (quoting PHILIP ALSTON, A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE ON THE
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 51 (2003), available at http://www.hurilink.org/tools/HRsPerspectives_
on_the_MDGs--Alston.pdf).
200 Id. Klasing, Moses, and Satterthwaite provide the following example:

[T]he ICCPR specifically provides individuals with the human right to participate in the political
life of the community. According to the ICCPR, all citizens have the rights to participate in the
conduct of public affairs, to vote and to be elected and to have access to public service. The
ICCPR also recognizes the same rights to recognition and equal protection under the law and to
freedom of opinion and expression. In addition, the ICCPR offers insight into preconditions for
meaningful and full participation. For example, everyone has the right to use his or her own
language, an important condition to ensure participation is possible. According to the Human
Rights Committee (HRC), the UN body charged with monitoring the implementation of the
ICCPR, the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs extends to “all aspects of public
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Participation is necessary at each stage of the rescue, recovery, and
rebuilding strategy-development process, from the initial needs assessment
through implementation and evaluation.201 Yet assessments in Haiti since the
earthquake have shown that “inconsistent with the rights-based approach,
humanitarian services have in many circumstances been provided through a
top-down approach, with international agencies making decisions about
peoples’ needs without securing meaningful input from the communities they
are intended to benefit.”202 Moreover, key stakeholders such as the beneficiary
communities and Haitian civil society have not been able to access the fora
where decisions directly impacting them are being made.203 Haiti’s poor
majority is especially marginalized from the rebuilding process.
Both the UN and the IHRC have extensively and inappropriately relied on
international NGOs to “be the voice of the people.”204 This treatment of Haiti
as a blank space where help can be infused has reduced efficiency by causing
international actors to overlook existing infrastructure and create parallel
structures. While the government in Haiti has limited capacity to respond to
natural disasters and implement assistance programs, important infrastructure
exists in the form of communities and grassroots organizations. These
organizations have the connections and know-how to implement projects
effectively.205 While the vast majority of funding after the earthquake went to
NGOs, not a single Haitian NGO was supported in the first flash appeal.206
This is harmful to the broader aid effort because local organizations have

administration, and the formulation and implementation of policy at international, national,
regional and local levels.”
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Human Rights Comm., General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights
Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights:
Addendum: Gen. Comment No. 25, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (Aug. 27, 1996)).
201 A Call for Human Rights-Based Approach, supra note 15.
202 Right to Food, supra note 9, at 80. “This was demonstrated in the OCHA evaluation, where one staff
member admitted that ‘[w]e do not interact with local NGOs or government, forget about interacting with
communities.’” Id. at 86 n.91 (quoting BHATTACHARJEE & LOSSIO, supra note 189, at 32); see also Hartberg,
supra note 10 at 12.
203 Right to Food, supra note 9, at 80.
204 Id. (quoting MARK SCHULLER, YORK COLLEGE, CITY UNIV. OF N.Y., UNSTABLE FOUNDATIONS:
IMPACT OF NGOS ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR PORT-AU-PRINCE’S INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE 32 (2011),
available at http://www.ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Report-unstable-foundations-final2.pdf).
205 See Caroline Preston & Nicole Wallace, 6 Months After Earthquake, Haiti Struggles to Rebuild,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (July 8, 2010), http://www.philanthropy.com/article/Charities-Struggle-to-Help/
66199.
206 HAS AID CHANGED?, supra note 54, at 16.
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established community connections and an understanding of the socioeconomic and cultural context.
Lack of adequate participation by local communities has characterized
much of the rebuilding effort, and a recent example illustrates that this practice
continues under President Michel Martelly’s administration. Shortly after
President Martelly’s inauguration on May 14, 2011, he announced a plan to
close six of the most visible displacement camps in the Port-au-Prince area and
relocate the families back to their original neighborhoods.207 The plan pays
displaced families to move out of camps into other housing.208 Families are
allocated a pre-determined sum that carries little or no relation to the actual
amount that would be needed to repair the damage of the house or to pay rent
in a new unit.209 The plan, commonly referred to as 16/6,210 is the pilot project
for closing camps and moving victims of 2010’s devastating earthquake into
permanent housing.
Implementation of the plan has moved more slowly than initially
proposed,211 but over the course of the months after its initial announcement,
the plan has become the de facto resettlement policy and has influenced a
perception that paid relocations are the solution to Haiti’s displacement
problem.212 To date, it is the closest resemblance of a national resettlement
policy, and the international community is focusing great attention and
resources on the plan; in mid-August, the Haiti Reconstruction Fund pledged
$78 million to fund it.213 Moreover, private landowners and local
municipalities and NGOs have adopted the model of paid relocation as the

207 NICOLE PHILLIPS, INST. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI & UNIV. OF S.F. SCH. OF LAW, HAITI’S
HOUSING CRISIS: RESULTS OF A HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON THE PROGRESS OF PRESIDENT MICHEL MARTELLY’S
100-DAY PLAN TO CLOSE SIX IDP CAMPS 5 (2011), available at http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2011/10/Martelly-100-Day-Report-final_Oct-3.pdf. The camps slated for closure are
Primature, Place Saint-Pierre, Place Boyer, Place Canapé-Vert, Mais Gaté, and Stade Sylvio Cator. Id. The
residents of these camps were deemed to have come from sixteen neighborhoods in surrounding areas. See id.
208 See id. at 4.
209 Beatrice Lindstrom & Jocelyn Brooks, Final Whistle for 514 Families as Haitian Government Illegally
Closes Stadium Camp, HUFFINGTON POST (July 28, 2011, 9:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/beatricelindstrom/final-whistle-for-514-fam_b_911638.html.
210 Jacqueline Charles, Michel Martelly Launches Housing Plan in Haiti, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 6, 2011),
http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/10/05/v-fullstory/2442531/michel-martelly-launches-housing.html.
211 The plan was initially presented to the CCCM Cluster as Martelly’s 100-day plan, with plans to close
four of the camps during Martelly’s first 100 days in office. See PHILLIPS, supra note 207, at 5.
212 See id.
213 Id. at 3.

CONCANNON&LINDSTROM GALLEYSFINAL3

2011]

CHEAPER, BETTER, LONGER-LASTING

3/27/2012 8:15 AM

1179

preferred method for moving displaced communities out of camps.214 To date,
four of the six camps in the plan have been partially or fully closed without
meaningful resettlement assistance.215 In practice, residents are commonly
given a deadline to leave a camp, often under the threat or use of force, and are
paid a fixed sum of $250 to $500 to support their relocation.216 Implemented in
this way, payment strategies do not lead to durable solutions because they do
not in actuality result in access to adequate alternative housing.217
The plan has directly impacted the living situation of many who were
displaced by the earthquake, yet neither displaced communities generally, nor
the specific camps targeted in the plan, were consulted in its development. In
August 2011, the Center for Law and Global Justice at the University of San
Francisco School of Law, the Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti, and
the BAI interviewed 150 households on the government’s implementation of
the housing plan, including camp closures, residents’ access to information and
input on the plan, and the provision of housing assistance.218 The survey found
that eighty-two percent of residents in the six camps had not been consulted on
their opinion regarding how settlement would be structured.219 Only thirtyeight percent of the households surveyed in the four camps where closure had
not yet begun had even heard of plans to close their camp.220 “Of those, fiftythree percent learned from rumor from other residents, and only 12.7 percent

214

See id. at 3. Over the course of the summer, the BAI saw a sharp increase in the number of cases of
forced evictions that included payment schemes. See Letter from Brian Concannon, Dir., Inst. for Justice &
Democracy in Haiti et al., to Ban Kai Moon, Sec’y-Gen. United Nations et al. (Aug. 23, 2011) (on file with
author). The Martelly Administration has tried to distance itself from these evictions, asserting that the mayors
and landowners are acting outside of the framework of the 100-day plan. See Lindstrom & Brooks, supra note
209. The president’s failure to stop or condemn the evictions, including those in two of the camps that are a
part of the plan, has been perceived as tacit encouragement, however. Id. The Mayor of Delmas specifically
purported to be acting under the direction of the president during an eviction in June. Letter from Mario
Joseph, Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, to the Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights (June 15, 2011),
available at ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Haiti-Precautionary-Measures-Update-to-IACHR
-15-June-2011REDACTED.pdf. “Furthermore, the money for the relocation was reported to have come from
both the mayor and” central government. Lindstrom & Brooks, supra note 209.
215 See PHILLIPS, supra note 207, at 7.
216 See Lindstrom & Brooks, supra note 209.
217 Id. “In Place Saint Pierre in the wealthy suburb of Petionville, the municipal government implemented
a similar strategy in April, paying displaced families $500—twice as much as offered in this case—to vacate a
public square.” Id. Many of these families “remained displaced and homeless after receiving the money
because it was inadequate to secure alternative housing. Government officials even admitted that the money
offered was generally insufficient to cover rent for a family of five in Port-au-Prince.” Id.
218 See PHILLIPS, supra note 207, at 2.
219 Id. at 2, 10.
220 Id. at 2, 10–11.
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heard it from a government official, the UN,” or an NGO.221 While the
compensation is meant to cover costs of repair and reconstruction, the amounts
are not based on an evaluation of actual costs. All of the residents surveyed in
Stade Sylvio Cator, where many residents were paid $250 before being moved
out, said that the money was not enough for them to relocate or pay rent.222
They also reported that the money was not enough to build a basic 12x10 foot
shack with a concrete floor, plywood walls and corrugated metal roof, which
costs about US$300.223
Prior consultation during the design of the plan could have ensured that it
responded effectively to the needs of those being resettled, thereby preventing
the waste of significant and critical financial and physical resources on a policy
that is ineffective and unsustainable. Community participation would also
ensure that the camp residents had access to adequate information in order to
plan for and make informed decisions about their future—critical components
to a durable solution for displacement. Meaningful participation is not only a
protected human right, but also has concrete practical benefits and should be
adopted as a best practice by the Martelly Administration and its international
supporters.
3. Transparency
Although not fully articulated in international law as a free-standing state
right, transparency is necessary for the full enjoyment of other fundamental
rights224—without transparency, rights-holders will not be able to hold actors
accountable for acts and omissions that impact their human rights, nor will
they be able to participate meaningfully in decision-making. In practice, the
right to transparency is therefore based on the recognized duty of states to take

221

Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 11.
223 Press Release, Mario Joseph & Nicole Phillips, Inst. for Justice & Democracy in Haiti, 100 Days into
Michel Martelly’s Presidency: Survey Reveals Government’s Closure of Camps Conflicts with Durable
Housing Solutions Proposed in Housing Plan (Aug. 18, 2011), http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/
2011/08/Survey-Results_Martelly-Plan_-Press-Release_Final.pdf.
224 For example, as described above, the right to participate in public affairs, as well as the right to an
effective remedy for the violation of human rights, is protected in international law. See supra note 200 and
accompanying text. In practice, participation in public affairs requires the ability to be aware and informed
about issues of public interest and government policy. See ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 25(a). In addition, in
order to seek redress for acts or omissions that impact rights, citizens must have knowledge of their rights,
understand the process to seek redress, and be able to reasonably meet any necessary evidentiary burden in
seeking that redress. See id. art. 2(3)(a).
222
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necessary steps to give effect to protected human rights.225 Further, the right to
freedom of information includes a right to access information (to “seek” and
“receive”), requiring transparency and openness on the part of informationholders.226 This right has been recognized specifically to include access to
information held by governmental bodies, subject only to extremely limited
exceptions, such as imminent threats to national security.227
Where international legal commitments extend to non-state actors engaged
in development initiatives, similar requirements of transparency apply. In the
context of humanitarian assistance and development, transparency includes
clear and publicly accessible financial records, procurement and distribution
policies, and project evaluation.228 Transparency requires making information
on all stages of the development and implementation of the humanitarian
response available and accessible to Haitians from all sectors of society.229 The
225 Id. art. 2(2); General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph
4, of the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights: Addendum: Gen. Comment No. 25 (57), Annex
V, para. 1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (Aug. 27, 1996) (“Whatever form of constitution or
government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects.”). This duty is
also articulated in other treaties. See, e.g., CRPD, supra note 127, art. 4(1)(a) (requiring states “[t]o adopt all
appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in
the present Convention”); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 48, art. 2 (“Where the exercise
of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other
provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the
provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those
rights or freedoms.”).
226 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 48, art. 13; ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 19.
227 See, e.g., Reyes v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 151 (Sept. 19, 2006); Társaság a
Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1, 4 (2009), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN
(follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “Társaság a
Szabadságjogokért” in the “Case Title” box) (“The disclosure of public information on request in fact falls
within the notion of the right ‘to receive,’ as understood by Article 10 § 1. This provision protects not only
those who wish to inform others but also those who seek to receive such information.”); Inter-American
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression art. 4 (adopted by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights at its 108th regular session, Oct. 19, 2000); African Commission on Human and People’s
Rights, African Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Information in Africa art. 4, 32d Sess. (Oct. 23,
2002). While non-binding, these declarations evidence state parties’ commitment to upholding the tenets of the
agreement in good faith.
228 See Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, in THE
PARIS DECLARATION ON AID EFFECTIVENESS AND THE ACCRA AGENDA FOR ACTION 1, 1 (2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf. One hundred thirty-six states, including Haiti, are
signatories to the declaration, as are numerous international and civil society organizations. See Countries,
Territories and Organisations Adhering to the Paris Declaration and AAA, ORG. FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3746,en_2649_3236398_36074966_1_1_1_1,00.
html (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
229 A Call for Human Rights-Based Approach, supra note 15.
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right to transparency also specifically suggests a duty on states to take
measures to increase participation with civil society organizations and other
members of the public.230 A lack of transparency can subvert political stability;
in October 2009, the senate voted to remove Haiti’s prime minister because of
a lack of transparency surrounding the spending of $197 million in aid to Haiti
for rebuilding after the 2008 storms.231
Transparency in Haiti after the earthquake has been severely lacking;
rights-holders have not received essential information about critical aspects of
the reconstruction process.232 The Haitian government has a duty to
communicate new policies, and international actors have a duty to provide the
government with up-to-date information regarding their programs and
activities in Haiti for public dissemination.233 Less than one third of camp
residents surveyed in October 2010 felt they were informed about the future—
whether regarding aid delivery or resettlement.234 The lack of transparency in
Haiti’s reconstruction process has inhibited participation in decision-making
and hindered collaboration.235 It has resulted in anger on the part of Haitians
who do not have access to information on how billions of aid money pledged
for Haiti has been spent. Around Port-au-Prince, graffiti reading “Aba ONG
volè” (“down with NGO thieves”), is not an uncommon site.236
The lack of transparency has hindered the success of aid efforts small and
large. In November 2010, the approach of Hurricane Tomas raised fears for the
1.3 million people living in precarious conditions under tarps and tents.237
Haiti’s only government-established displacement camp, Camp CorailCesselesse, sits on a flood plain, raising particular concerns about
230 See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption art. 3(11), opened for signature Mar. 29, 1996, 35
I.L.M. 727. See generally INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY & TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION
& HUMAN RIGHTS: MAKING THE CONNECTION (2009) (encouraging private individuals and institutions to
collaborate with anti-corruption institutions).
231 A Call for Human Rights-Based Approach, supra note 15.
232 Right to Food, supra note 9, at 80.
233 Id. “This was demonstrated in the lead-up to Hurricane Tomas in November 2010, when residents of
Camp Corail-Cesselesse chose not heed the advice of international agencies to evacuate because they were not
told where they would be taken and feared that they would not be allowed to return to their camp.” Id. at 86
n.94.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Leslie Macmillan, High Stakes for Haiti, TUFTS J. (Apr. 21, 2010), http://tuftsjournal.tufts.edu/2010/
04_2/features/02.
237 See Kathleen Bergin & Nicole Phillips, Facing Man-Made Disasters in Haiti, HOUSTON CHRON. (Nov.
9, 2010, 6:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Facing-man-made-disaster-in-Haiti1695510.php.
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vulnerability.238 Immediately preceding the hurricane, the government and aid
community operating in Corail began a concerted effort to evacuate the
residents from the camp.239 Hours before the hurricane hit landfall, aid workers
instructed residents to pack up and evacuate the camp.240 Of the roughly 8,000
residents living in the camp, only a few hundred agreed to leave.241 Most
refused, and as hostility escalated, the aid workers left.242 The hurricane shifted
course in the last minute, sparing the population in Camp Corail and other
vulnerable areas.243 The question remains, however, as to why the residents
refused to leave.
Conversations with residents in Corail and elsewhere revealed a real fear
that the evacuation was actually an eviction from the camp.244 Two factors
made this fear reasonable: the epidemic of forced evictions that have swept
Haiti’s displacement camps and the near complete lack of transparency
preceding the evacuation. Within a couple of weeks of the earthquake, private
landlords and governmental agents began evicting the displaced off the land.245
Forced evictions from displacement camps, often under intimidation or use of
force, have become one of the most prevalent threats facing displaced
communities.246 In March 2011, the IOM estimated that a quarter of all
displacement camps faced an imminent threat of eviction.247 Meanwhile, the
residents of Corail were given little to no information about the hurricane,

238

See id.; Residents of Settlement Camps Evacuate as Tropical Storm Tomas Approaches, WEATHER
NETWORK (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.theweathernetwork.com/news/storm_watch_stories3&stormfile=
residents_of_resettlement_ca_041110. For a discussion of the circumstances that led to Corail’s establishment
in this precarious location, see supra Part II.B.3.
239 Bergin & Phillips, supra note 237; see also Residents of Settlement Camps Evacuate as Tropical Storm
Tomas Approaches, supra note 238.
240 Bergin & Phillips, supra note 237.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Haiti Homeless Caught Between Eviction and Storm, JAM. OBSERVER (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.
jamaicaobserver.com/Haiti-homeless-caught-between-eviction-and-storm_8121928. The Associated Press
reported the dilemma as follows: in the wake of Hurricane Tomas, “[a]n estimated 1.3 million homeless faced
their hardest decision since the earthquake: Do they follow the government’s advice and leave their slapped
together shelters ahead of the storm and risk never being allowed to return? Or do they risk their lives and
stay?” Id.
245 Ezra Fieser, Landowners Force Haitians out of Camps, GLOBAL POST (Feb. 23, 2011, 6:07 AM)
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/americas/110210/haiti-homeless-camp-violence.
246 See id.
247 See CAMP COORDINATION & CAMP MGMT. CLUSTER & INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, EVICTIONS IN IDP
CAMPS REPORT 2 (2011), available at http://www.ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/IOM_
EVICTION-REPORT-MARCH_2011-ENGLISH-1.pdf.
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about the dangers that their land was on, and perhaps most strikingly, about
where they were being taken.248 While officials reportedly had a list of
thousands of useable shelters (mostly designated schools and churches), it was
not released to the public.249 By the time information did become available as
to the evacuation site, many Corail residents had already developed a deep
skepticism of the motives behind the move. While the efforts to evacuate the
residents of Camp Corail were in reality motivated by the best interest of the
community, the effort was rendered unsuccessful in large part because of a
lack of transparency and communication with the residents.
4. Accountability
Accountability is a bedrock principle of human rights—without it, rights
are unenforceable. The right to a remedy requires states to set up systems that
can ensure that those who violate human rights are held accountable and that
those who are wronged can seek redress.250 It is a central principle of all
human rights treaties,251 codified in Article 2 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights; Article 6 of the International Covenant on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Article 14 of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment; and Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
among others.
The OHCHR has explained that accountability is “the raison d’être of the
rights-based approach.”252 As Klasing et al. note, “[R]ights-based
programming aims to directly strengthen both the capacity of the state to
respond to human rights violations through its official agencies and the
capacity of rights-holders to demand accountability of those responsible for
fulfilling rights and redressing wrongs.”253 The rights-based approach
mandates that donor governments, international organizations, and
implementing NGOs are directly accountable to the Haitian people, and
requires that mechanisms be put into place through which the community

248 See Johnathan M. Katz, Confusion, Fear as Haiti Camps Evacuate for Storm, ABC ACTION NEWS
(Nov. 4, 2010), http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/national_world&id=7764484.
249 Haiti Homeless Caught Between Eviction and Storm, supra note 244.
250 Klasing et al., supra note 196, at 16.
251 Id.
252 OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CLAIMING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT
GOALS: A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH, at 15, U.N. Sales No. E.08.XIV6 (2008).
253 Klasing et al., supra note 196, at 16.
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receiving assistance can report problems and access remedies.254
“Accountability . . . requires mechanisms through which the community
receiving assistance is able to report problems and access remedies.”255
Actors in the development field have undertaken significant work to
improve accountability by investing resources and attention to mechanisms
such as courts, national human rights institutions mandated to investigate and
remedy violations, or ombudsmen.256 This has created a curious paradox,
however, wherein international actors focus on building up national
accountability mechanisms while they themselves largely fall outside of any
accountability framework. MINUSTAH’s operations in Haiti illustrate this
incongruity. One of the peacekeeping operation’s main functions is
“development of the rule of law” through training police officers and building
up investigatory, prosecutorial, and adjudicatory capacities of various public
institutions.257 Simultaneously, MINUSTAH and its members enjoy nearly
absolute immunity from legal processes arising out of any acts perpetrated in
Haiti, including those that rise to the level of grave human rights violations.258
Numerous scholars have raised serious concerns regarding the impunity of UN
peacekeeping forces and have put forth recommendations for mechanisms that
will achieve accountability outside of the formal legal system, but these have
not been implemented.259 MINUSTAH’s Status of Forces Agreement
(“SOFA”) with Haiti calls for the establishment of a Standing Claims
Commission to investigate and provide compensation for civil claims.260 While
this is a common feature of all SOFAs, no peacekeeping force has yet to
establish one,261 leaving victims of crimes or human rights abuses, including
rape, sexual violence, and wrongful death, without any avenues to seek redress.

254

A Call for Human Rights-Based Approach, supra note 15.
Id.
256 Klasing et al., supra note 196, at 16.
257 S.C. Res. 1529, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1529 (Feb. 29, 2004); see also Restoring a Secure and Stable
Environment, MINUSTAH, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/index.shtml (last visited
Nov. 15, 2011).
258 See Right to Food, supra note 9, at 124 (arguing that MINUSTAH’s vast immunity and lack of
accountability in Haiti runs counter to the Haitian government’s duty to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to
a remedy).
259 See, e.g., Catherine E. Sweetser, Providing Effective Remedies to Victims of Abuse by Peacekeeping
Personnel, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1643, 1661–63 (2008) (arguing for a compensation mechanism for victims of
abuses).
260 Matt Halling & Blaine Bookey, Peacekeeping in Name Alone: Accountability for the United Nations in
Haiti, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 461, 483 (2008).
261 Id.
255
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In the context of post-earthquake Haiti, the international actors who are
influencing much of the direction and implementation of reconstruction are
also largely unaccountable to the Haitian people. Any accountability that does
exist is largely to the donor and not the people they are seeking to serve.262
International NGOs are primarily funded by national development agencies
and donor governments, and are “beholden to the broader policy imperatives of
their funders.”263 Some also draw significant resources from individual donors,
but such private donors often lack the incentive to follow up on project
implementation.264 One example that illustrates this lack of accountability is
the relocation of displaced families from Jenkins-Penn Haitian Relief
Organization (“J/P HRO”), a large camp located on the Petionville Golf Club,
which is managed by actor Sean Penn, to Camp Corail, discussed in the
preceding section.265 The relocation was motivated by land surveys that found
certain parts of J/P HRO to be on a slope subject to flooding and landslides.266
The families who agreed to move were told they would receive shelter, food
rations, clean water, free medical care, and access to schools at the new site.267
There was also an understanding that “they would be first in line for jobs in
Korean-owned garment factories that the Haitian government pledged would
soon be built in the area.”268
When the families arrived, however, they were met by barren, dusty plains
at the foot of a denuded mountain, miles from any economic developments,
schools, markets, or hospitals.269 Their shelter consisted of flimsy tents subject
to flooding and overheating.270 There were no jobs, because the hoped-for
factories would not be built for months—or even years.271 Ironically, the Corail
site is on a floodplain just as dangerous as the J/P HRO site.272 What is more, a
262 Janet Reitman, Beyond Relief: How the World Failed Haiti, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 4, 2011, 1:35 PM),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/how-the-world-failed-haiti-20110804 (noting the general lack of
accountability for NGOs, as seen by workers on the ground).
263 Id.
264 See Kate Snow et al., Where Things Stand: U.S. Charity Donations to Haiti, ABC NEWS (Feb. 11,
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/HaitiEarthquake/haiti-us-charity-donations-haiti-earthquake-victims-spent/
story?id=9786221#.TsPW83Fqj7I.
265 Reitman, supra note 262.
266 See id.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. As of September 1, 2011, no building has begun on a factory in the Corail area. Greger Calhan, Out
of Options in Haiti?, J. FOREIGN REL. (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.jofr.org/2011/09/01/out-of-options-in-haiti.
272 Reitman, supra note 262.
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combination of a lack of clear communication from the government and
international community and the Haitian rumor mill caused thousands more to
flock to the area under the impression that Corail would be the government’s
new site for resettlement of the displaced.273 Canaan, the area surrounding
Corail,274 is now the home to approximately 30,000 displaced families who
live under the constant threat of flooding and the vast majority of whom lack
access to even basic life-saving services.275 The response to the situation has
been to close off the “official” camp of Corail with barbed wire from the
broader settlement of Canaan.276 Whereas residents of Corail now have
temporary wooden shelters, lighting, security, and other services, those living
in Canaan have been criminalized in the press and in aid circles as squatters
and opportunists.277 They have been denied shelter, water services, choleraprevention trainings, and other critical services.278 As a spokeswoman for
Oxfam told Rolling Stone, the situation amounts to “a ton of people living in a
flux state, without safe shelter, who don’t know what the future
holds. . . . It’s Haiti post-earthquake in a nutshell.”279

273 See Jessica Desvarieux, Getting Haiti’s Earthquake Homeless To Move, TIME (Apr. 13, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1981295,00.html. The government obtained the land through
eminent domain and released a decree that described that the land, which included all of Canaan was being
taken for resettlement. See Tim Padgett & Jessica Desvarieux, Haiti: Where Building a Hospital Can Be
Illegal, TIME (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2031102,00.html.
274 Reitman, supra note 262 (noting the name of the region surrounding Corail has been dubbed Canaan,
derived from “the biblical promised land”).
275 Padgett & Desvarieux, supra note 269.
276 See INT’L CRISIS GRP., POST-QUAKE HAITI: SECURITY DEPENDS ON RESETTLEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT 10 (2011), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/haiti/B25%20Post-quake%
20Haiti%20-%20Security%20Depends%20on%20Resettlement%20and%20Development.pdf (supporting the
idea of a distinction between official Corail and unofficial Canaan).
277 See, e.g., Emily Troutman, Squatters Looking for a Home of Their Own in Haiti, AOL NEWS (Oct. 12,
2010, 6:36 AM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/10/12/haitis-new-frontier-scrapping-for-a-piece-of-a-dream
(portraying the residents in Canaan as deceitful opportunists who hailed from other parts of Haiti to take
advantage of services in Canaan). The notion that the settlers in Canaan are not actually victims of the
earthquake was deconstructed by a survey conducted by Un Techo para Mi Pais, one of the few NGOs that
works to provide services in Canaan. See generally UN TECHO PARA MI PAIS, YEARLY SUMMARY 2010:
SUMMARY OF THE PROGRESS MADE ONE YEAR AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE (2010), available at http://untecho.
org/annualSummaryHaiti.pdf. Eighty-eight percent of the respondent households reported that they moved to
Canaan as a direct result of the earthquake, either because their houses were destroyed or in need of repair. Id.
at 6 (stating that 85.41% of the population in Canaan will not go home because their housing was destroyed in
the earthquake, and that 2.57% will not go home because their housing is being reconstructed). The camp
manager of Corail has distinguished between residents of Corail as IDPs and residents of Canaan as squatters
entitled to fewer rights. Interview with Bryant Castro, Staffer, American Refugee Committee (Mar. 14, 2010).
278 See Calhan, supra note 271.
279 Reitman, supra note 262 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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For the people of Corail and Canaan, there is no measure of accountability
for the situation in which they currently find themselves. Rolling Stone reports
that, “[i]n the aftermath of the move, no one in the State Department or the
Haitian government seemed willing to take responsibility for the relocation—
or even for the rationale behind it.”280 Virtually every actor involved has
blamed others in a relentless game of finger pointing that has left the real
victims without accountability. It has pitted U.S.-based aid groups against
Washington bureaucrats, UN agencies against private aid groups, and veteran
insiders against “a new breed of technocrats who, with little to no experience
in development, have descended on Port-au-Prince armed with bold theories
and PowerPoint presentations, as if the entire country were a case study from
Harvard Business School.”281
5. Nondiscrimination
The final pillar of the rights-based approach, nondiscrimination, is a
fundamental, “crosscutting principle in international human rights law.”282 It is
a core principle recognized in each of the major human rights treaties, and it is
universal in application.283 It prohibits discrimination on the basis of a list of
non-exhaustive categories, including sex, race, and color.284 Furthermore,
according to the Inter-American Court, “the fundamental principle of equality
and nondiscrimination has entered the realm of jus cogens.”285 It therefore
binds all states, irrespective of their adhesion to treaties.286 Jus cogens norms,
like the prohibition on discrimination, are nonderogable and must be respected
even during times of a national emergency.287 In post-earthquake Haiti, donor
countries thus have a duty to act in a way that complies with the principle of
equality and must ensure that their programs and actions do not have a
discriminatory effect.288 They must also take care that their assistance to Haiti
does not reinforce that society’s entrenched inequalities and discrimination,
280

Id.
Id.
282 What Are Human Rights?, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/
Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶ 110 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/opiniones.cfm;
IACHR Brief, supra note 18, at 11.
286 IACHR Brief, supra note 18, at 11.
287 Id.
288 Id.
281
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regarding gender, creed, economic status, social condition, color, and
language, among other categories.”289
Nondiscrimination requires that the poorest and most vulnerable Haitians
be targeted for priority assistance and empowerment. It requires conscious
outreach and inclusion. Haiti’s poor majority has a long history of
marginalization from political, economic, and social life.290 One particularly
salient example of discrimination post-earthquake is the intentional exclusion
of poor women from participating in strategies related to responding to genderbased violence (“GBV”).291 Haiti has experienced an epidemic of violence
against women and girls in displacement camps after the earthquake. The
quake placed women in a particularly vulnerable situation as a result of “the
collapse of social infrastructures, the erosion of family and community
networks, inequitable access to social services, absence of law and order, lack
of secure housing or safe neighborhoods and dependence resulting from
economic dislocation.”292 In spite of “scarce resources and under brutal
conditions, [poor] women in the camps have organized a breathtaking array of
ad-hoc services, including community-based security patrols, psycho-social
support, legal advocacy and medical care for rape survivors.”293 Some of the
most comprehensive and systematized support for victims of rape are
organized and implemented at the grassroots level by Haitian women’s groups
and other organizations composed of community organizers among Haiti’s
poor majority.
Despite their invaluable work, Haitian grassroots women’s groups have
been intentionally excluded from “meaningful participation in the coordination
of efforts to address and prevent sexual violence in Port-au-Prince IDP
camps.”294 After the earthquake, the UN established a subcluster on GBV to
increase protection of women and girls and coordinate the response to the
crisis.295 For more than a year, grassroots women’s groups have been asking
for full participation and leadership in the implementation of responses to

289

Id. (citation omitted)
See Reitman, supra note 262.
291 See MADRE ET AL., OUR BODIES ARE STILL TREMBLING: HAITIAN WOMEN CONTINUE TO FIGHT
AGAINST RAPE 22 (2011), available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/9BB8998DF0D1B
A9349257815000F2EA1-Full_Report.pdf.
292 Id. at 4.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 22.
295 Id. at 13.
290
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GBV.296 Requests that meetings be held in Haitian Creole or that a translation
be made available for the vast majority of Haitians who do not speak French
were rejected by the coordinator of the subcluster on the grounds that
“translation would be ‘tedious’ and that holding the meetings in French is
important because the international groups would otherwise be incapable of
communicating with one another.”297 Despite the fact that the grassroots
groups provide some of the most comprehensive support for victims of rape
and the BAI is the only legal office in Haiti with free and specialized legal
services for rape victims, the groups were further excluded from the
subclusters referral cards, which list organizations that provide critical services
to survivors of sexual violence.298 Repeated inquiries into the reasons for
exclusion received differing answers, none of which was grounded in rational
policy motivations. A meeting with a UN representative later revealed that “the
exclusion of [the groups] . . . was an internal decision” made under the direct
order of the Haitian Women’s Ministry, which sought to intentionally exclude
the groups in order “to curry favor with the more affluent and powerful local
Haitian women’s organizations.”299
This discrimination has had a direct and profound impact on at-risk
populations and has also led to significant waste and misdirection of aid by
donor countries.300 This discrimination against poor women also violates
international law and standards requiring such participation301 In November
2010, the IACHR issued directives to the Haitian government requesting that it
take measures to ensure that grassroots women’s groups have full participation
and leadership in planning and implementing responses to GBV.302 As stressed
in a submission for Haiti’s Universal Periodic Review in October 2011,
296 Id. at 22. The grassroots groups have raised these points in individual meetings with UN officers, in
public reports, in the media, and before international mechanisms such as the IACHR and the Human Rights
Council. See id. In November 2011, the IACHR issued a directive to the Haitian government specifically on
the point of grassroots participation, yet the exclusion has persisted. Id.
297 Id. at 22–23.
298 See id. at 21.
299 See id. at 23.
300 “For example, because of a failure to consult and coordinate with grassroots organizations, batteryoperated flashlights were purchased and distributed to increase lighting in the IDP camps. These flashlights are
now useless because camp residents cannot afford replacement batteries. . . . [S]olar flashlights, available at a
comparable price, would still be working and could significantly increase lighting and security in the camps.”
Id. at 22. The refusal to list grassroots women’s groups on reference cards has also denied victims critical
information on a full list of service providers. Id. at 23.
301 MADRE et al., Gender-Based Violence Against Haitian Women & Girls in Internal Displacement
Camps, in IJDH SUBMISSION TO THE UNHRC, supra note 9, at 88, 91.
302 Id.
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however, “grassroots women groups operating within displacement camps
continue to be excluded in post-disaster needs assessments and in the planning
of activities designed to mitigate such violence.”303
CONCLUSION
While the state of affairs in Haiti and its fraught relationships with
international actors may leave one to throw one’s arms in the air in despair, the
true lesson to be drawn from Haiti is that its vulnerability to natural disasters is
neither due to its hopeless fate nor a result of chance. The solution to
mitigating vulnerability lies in empowering rights-holders to demand
fulfillment of their own rights and empowering the Haitian government to
fulfill them. Haitian civil society has the information, experience, strength, and
networks in place to drive Haiti’s future in a direction that respects human
rights. The treatment of Haiti as a blank space that stands to benefit from a
profusion of NGOs, church groups, volunteer groups, and other wellintentioned do-gooders has hindered Haitians from realizing their status as
rights-holders. As Haiti transitions from a post-disaster emergency into a state
of development, a rights-based approach will be especially critical to ensuring
that rebuilding places the realization of human rights at the forefront and
reduces vulnerability to disasters in the future.
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